

# HORN OF AFRICA: WEBS OF CONFLICT & PATHWAYS TO PEACE

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The Wilson  
Center

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## About the Leadership Project

The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2005 and seeks to promote holistic and sustainable approaches to international conflict resolution, prevention, and post-conflict recovery. The Leadership Project's founding methodology is based on the importance of inclusivity, interest-based negotiation training, and demonstration of interdependence to help rebuild fractured government systems and create greater collaborative capacity in post-conflict countries. Key Leadership Project programming consists of in-country training interventions for leaders in societies emerging from violent conflict, as well as Washington-based public events and country-consultations on specific conflict-prone or affected states that brings together experts, practitioners, and policymakers to discuss some of the most persistent policy challenges. The Leadership Project also launched a major research effort titled, "Southern Voices in the Northern Policy Debate: Including the Global South," funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York, that will engage Africa-based research and policy institutions in providing a southern perspective for the American policymakers on the mutual challenges faced by North and South. The Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity works in close collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Africa Program.

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### List of Abbreviations

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| ACLED  | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data                      |
| AMIS   | AU Mission in Sudan   |
| AMISOM | AU Mission in Somalia                                       |
| ASWJ   | Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma (Somalia)                              |
| AU     | African Union   |
| CAR    | Central African Republic                                    |
| CPA    | Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)                       |
| DDR    | Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration              |
| DRC    | Democratic Republic of Congo                                |
| EEBC   | Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission                        |
| ESPA   | Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement                               |
| EU     | European Union  |
| FDI    | Foreign Direct Investment                                   |
| GDP    | Gross Domestic Product                                      |
| GOSS   | Government of Southern Sudan (before southern independence) |
| ICC    | International Criminal Court                                |
| ICU    | Islamic Courts Union (Somalia)                              |
| IED    | Improvised explosive device                                 |
| IGAD   | Inter-governmental Authority on Development                 |
| JEM    | Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)                       |
| LJM    | Liberation and Justice Movement (Sudan)                     |
| LRA    | Lord’s Resistance Army                                      |
| OLF    | Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)                           |
| ONLF   | Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia)                 |
| SAF    | Sudanese Armed Forces                                       |
| SPLM/A | Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army                     |
| SSDF   | South Sudan Defense Forces                                  |
| TFG    | Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)                   |
| UN     | United Nations  |
| UNAMID | AU–UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur                              |
| UNISFA | UN Interim Security Force in Abyei                          |
| UNMIS  | UN Mission in Sudan   |
| UNMISS | UN Mission in South Sudan                                   |
| UNPOS  | UN Political Office for Somalia                             |
| UNSOA  | UN Support Office for AMISOM                                |

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## INTRODUCTION

Measured by almost any criteria, in recent decades the Horn of Africa has been one of the world's most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990.<sup>1</sup> As one particularly important external actor in the region, the U.S. government has for too long looked at the Horn through lenses which have emphasized regime security, counterterrorism, religious fanaticism, and tribalism. In early 2007, this prompted one widely circulated study to conclude that,

“stemming the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies has become such an overwhelming strategic objective for Washington that it has overshadowed U.S. efforts to resolve conflicts and promote good governance; in everything but rhetoric, counterterrorism now consumes U.S. policy in the Greater Horn as totally as anticommunism did a generation ago.”<sup>2</sup>

Four years on, there have been some signs of improvement, most notably the efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, and the adoption of the “dual-track” approach in Somalia by engaging directly with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as Mogadishu. Overall, however, the focus on regime security, counterterrorism and extremism has clearly failed to produce either a stable or peaceful region. At best, it has succeeded in encouraging pockets of (highly iniquitous) economic growth and consolidating a degree of order based on coercive repression rather than a widespread satisfaction with the status quo.

This paper suggests that viewing the Horn through a conflict resolution and peacebuilding lens would focus policymakers' attention on an alternative agenda focused on issues of good governance, the rule of law, human security, and supporting local state-society complexes that work for their people. Developing new, comprehensive and

integrated approaches to building peace and resolving conflict should therefore be *the* strategic priority for external actors concerned about the current trajectory of the region's states and its peoples.

To that end, this paper should be read in conjunction with a second document produced by members of the Wilson Center's Horn of Africa Project Steering Committee titled, *Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: What Role for the United States?* That document is informed by the analysis and historical background provided here but offers a set of recommendations for how the U.S. government might engage more constructively with the states and peoples in the Horn to build peace. Both documents start from the assumptions that the status quo is failing the people of the Horn and that the majority of recent international policies pursued with regard to the region's conflicts have not only failed, but have often been counter-productive.

This paper is explicitly intended to stimulate renewed debate about what a Horn of Africa policy focused on peacebuilding and conflict resolution might look like and what political and bureaucratic barriers the U.S. government would need to overcome to formulate and implement such an approach.<sup>3</sup>

Its central purpose is to illuminate the complex political terrain in which policies to build peace and resolve conflict will have to take place and to make tentative suggestions as to what priorities should guide an alternative comprehensive and integrated approach to the Horn. It achieves this objective by analyzing the major patterns, cross-cutting issues, and interrelationships evident in the Horn's recent armed conflicts.

To address these issues, the paper proceeds in five parts. **Section 1** begins by summarizing the patterns of violent conflicts in the Horn since 1990 as well as the various forms of international peace and justice mechanisms currently shaping the regional



terrain, specifically peacekeeping operations, peace processes and peacemaking initiatives.

**Section 2** makes the case that the region's conflict dynamics need to be conceptualized as complex and often interconnected social processes which are *simultaneously*, but to varying degrees, localized, nationalized, regionalized and globalized.

**Section 3** discusses six of the most significant cross-cutting issues which influence political violence within the region. These are: the centrality of governance issues; ongoing patterns of mutual destabilization; the importance of local (sub-state) dynamics; the salience of the region's borderlands and frontier zones; the impact of resources, particularly land, oil, and water; and the role of diaspora communities.

With these contextual issues in mind, **Section 4** focuses attention on the five conflicts which have the potential to generate the most serious negative consequences for the region as a whole: 1) the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, which is about far more than a border dispute; 2) the cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia; 3) the many sources of conflict between the new South Sudan and its northern neighbor; 4) the various struggles within South Sudan; and 5) the various struggles within northern Sudan, especially those within Darfur, Southern Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State.

Building on the preceding analysis, **Section 5** proposes five priority areas that might inform a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to the Horn: promote conflict resolution initiatives, support good governance, strengthen regional cooperation, alleviate food insecurity, and boost economic growth and regional economic integration.

The paper concludes by posing ten questions designed to stimulate debate about what a new way forward in the Horn of Africa might entail.

## SECTION 1: CURRENT PATTERNS OF WAR AND PEACE IN THE HORN

The Horn of Africa remains one of the world's most conflicted regions. This has contributed to some of the lowest development indicators on the planet and some of the highest levels of food insecurity and poverty. This section briefly summarizes the extent of violent conflicts in the Horn since 1990, as well as the various forms of international peace and justice mechanisms currently shaping the regional terrain, specifically peacekeeping operations, peace processes and peacemaking initiatives.

### Political Violence

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, since 1990, the Horn has suffered from 32 state-based armed conflict dyads (see Appendix A), 179 non-state armed conflict dyads (see Appendix B), and 22 dyads of one-sided violence campaigns (see Appendix C).<sup>4</sup> These state-based armed conflicts have resulted in approximately 231,510 battle-related fatalities; the non-state armed conflicts have killed approximately 31,511 people; and roughly 25,264 have been massacred in the campaigns of one-sided violence. These figures do not include people killed in extrajudicial killings by the region's governments and the many people who have died

because of various traumas brought on by violence and displacement, chiefly disease and malnutrition. Although none of the Horn's states have escaped all of these forms of political violence, the conflicts and fatalities have been dispersed highly unequally across the region. Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have had roughly equal numbers of state-based armed conflicts, but significantly more than the region's other states. Non-state armed conflicts in the Horn have been concentrated in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, with the latter two states experiencing over two-thirds of all related fatalities. Sudan and Uganda have witnessed, by far, the most deadly campaigns of one-sided violence over this period.

These statistics reveal at least six general conclusions about recent patterns of political violence in the Horn. First, the vast majority of armed conflicts have been of the "non-state" variety, that is, those fought between different non-state actors. In Somalia's case, there were many years when no central government existed. However, in the Horn's other countries the existence of such conflicts highlights the fact that they usually occur in locations where central government structures have little reach and/or minimal influence on local dynamics, and where alternative governance structures are more prominent. With regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, it means that advocates cannot focus their attention solely on the activities of governments or at the Track One level of diplomacy.

Second, the conflicts which produced the most fatalities were those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Conflict resolution efforts should, therefore, make it a priority to prevent the recurrence of both these disputes, as well as other inter-state confrontations.

A third conclusion is that the majority of the region's state-based armed conflicts have been intra-state, pitting governments against armed insurgents,

#### Political Violence in the Horn 1990-2010

1. 32 state-based armed conflicts where a government is one of the belligerent parties.
2. 179 non-state armed conflicts fought between non-governmental groups.
3. 22 campaigns of one-sided violence where civilians are massacred.

most of whom have articulated grievances about existing governance structures rather than making explicitly territorial/secessionist claims.

Fourth, although few of these armed conflicts have been of the inter-state variety, the region's states have a long history of "mutual destabilization" whereby governments support (overtly or covertly) insurgents in neighboring states in order to weaken what they consider to be oppositional regimes (discussed further in **Section 3**).<sup>5</sup>

A fifth conclusion is that in recent years, the majority of deaths from campaigns of one-sided violence can be traced to one key actor, namely, the current regime in Khartoum. In addition to massacres committed by its own soldiers, al Bashir's regime has also supported the two biggest non-state sources of civilian massacres — the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the *janjawid* militias in Darfur.

Finally, the large number of armed conflicts highlights the rather obvious fact that the region's institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention and early warning suffer from a range of serious conceptual and practical limitations.<sup>6</sup> These deficiencies clearly need to be overcome.

From the vantage point of October 2011, eight clusters of distinct, but related, armed conflicts stand out (the first five of which will be discussed in more detail in **Section 4** of this paper):

1. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia;
2. the cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia;
3. tensions between the new state of South Sudan and its northern neighbor;
4. conflicts within southern Sudan;
5. conflicts within northern Sudan;
6. intra-Ethiopian conflicts;<sup>7</sup>
7. the wandering trail of destruction cut by the LRA through northern Uganda, southern Sudan and elsewhere; and
8. the low-intensity conflicts concerning armed cattle-raiding clustered in the frontier zones at the nexus of the Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Sudanese borders.

The episodes of political violence in the Horn have stimulated international reactions that are varied and inconsistent. Of most significance for this paper are the ongoing peacekeeping operations, peace processes and peacemaking initiatives, including the proliferation of special envoys and the concomitant international contact groups on Somalia and Sudan.

It is also important to note that since December 2009, Eritrea has been the target of United Nations (UN) sanctions for its role in supporting insurgents in Somalia and its actions against Djibouti. Security Council Resolution 1907, which imposed these sanctions, was reportedly drafted by Uganda in response to earlier calls for sanctions against Eritrea made by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU). These sanctions have been controversial — not least because Ethiopia and Kenya have also provided military support to armed groups not allied with Somalia's transitional government (see **Section 4**). Nevertheless, there does seem to be strong evidence of Eritrean support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia and of *Hizbul Islam* and *Ras Kamboni* in Somalia. But there has been considerable recent questioning of whether Eritrea provided similar support to *al-Shabaab* forces. Such criticism was strengthened by suggestions that the allegations made by the UN Monitoring Group — that about 2,000 Eritrean soldiers entered Somalia in 2006 to support *al-Shabaab* — are false.<sup>8</sup> (One suggestion was that these soldiers in Somalia were in fact from the ONLF and the Oromo Liberation Front.<sup>9</sup>) The Monitoring Group also later acknowledged that in recent years "the scale and nature" of Eritrean support for such groups had "either diminished or become less visible."<sup>10</sup> In its July 2011 report, however, the Monitoring

## THE EPISODES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE HORN HAVE STIMULATED INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS THAT ARE VARIED AND INCONSISTENT.

Group was more forthright, concluding that Eritrea was providing “training, financial and logistical support to armed opposition groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan and possibly Uganda” and that its continued involvement in Somalia and relationship with *al-Shabaab* represented “a small but troubling part of the overall equation.”<sup>11</sup> The Group also concluded that “in January 2011, the Government of Eritrea conceived, planned, organized and directed a failed plot to disrupt the African Union summit in Addis Ababa by bombing a variety of civilian and governmental targets.”<sup>12</sup> By mid-October, the UN Security Council was debating a draft resolution circulated by Gabon and co-sponsored by Nigeria on whether to impose additional sanctions on Eritrea’s leaders.<sup>13</sup>

Eritrea suspended its membership of IGAD in April 2007 and of the AU in April 2009 in protest at the organization’s call for sanctions against it. In mid-January 2011, Eritrea returned its ambassador to the AU. In late July 2011, Eritrea also announced that it wanted to reactivate its membership of IGAD. However, given the continuing sanctions against Eritrea, it was not surprising that this became a controversial and drawn-out issue. In late August, for example, the Eritrean representative was refused permission to attend an IGAD meeting on Somalia.

### Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations are currently being run by the African Union (with UN support) in Somalia (AMISOM, 2007-present) and by the

United Nations in Sudan (UNAMID, 2008-present; UNMISS, July 2011-present; and UNISFA, June 2011-present). In addition to these missions, the African Union is in the process of authorizing a Regional Task Force involving the armed forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo to neutralize the threat to civilians posed by the wandering Lord’s Resistance Army.

### *African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*

Established in early 2007, AMISOM was deployed to Mogadishu under a controversial African Union mandate in the aftermath of the Ethiopian military campaign to remove the Islamic Courts Union and install Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the capital city. Its mandate was to protect the TFG, not least by countering *al-Shabaab*’s insurgency. AMISOM was initially comprised of about 1,000 Ugandan soldiers until a small contingent of Burundian troops were also deployed at the end of that year. With the departure of Ethiopian soldiers from Mogadishu in early 2009, AMISOM and the TFG’s own forces were left alone to battle *al-Shabaab* militia for control of Mogadishu’s various districts. Since then, AMISOM’s strength grew in fits and starts, reaching just over 9,000 troops and a small number of police officers by early 2011. Arguably the most controversial aspect of AMISOM’s operations was its indiscriminate use of force, including mortars and artillery, in response to *al-Shabaab* attacks. This may have been directly responsible for several hundred civilian deaths and led to calls from a variety of NGOs for AMISOM to give much greater attention to civilian protection. (At the time of writing, AMISOM is in the process of developing a new strategy for civilian protection.) AMISOM’s major breakthrough came in August 2011 when *al-Shabaab* forces signaled their withdrawal from Mogadishu. However, the suicide truck bomb which killed over 70 people outside the Ministry of Education in Mogadishu in early October demonstrated the switch in *al-Shabaab*’s

tactics from overt to covert confrontation. As of September 2011, Uganda and Burundi remain the only troop contributing countries but AMISOM is trying to reach its authorized level of 12,000 troops through the speedy deployment of additional troops pledged by Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, the Republic of Guinea, and Sierra Leone. It is also in the process of establishing a Guard Force of some 850 soldiers to provide security, escort and protection services to international personnel, including from the UN.

Although it has often been referred to as a peacekeeping mission, from the outset AMISOM had no genuine peace to keep. With the collapse of the Djibouti Agreement AMISOM's principal function was to protect the TFG by supporting the Ethiopian-led counterinsurgency efforts against *al-Shabaab* forces. Along the way, AMISOM has been supported by the UN's Political Office (UNPOS) and, since 2009, its Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), as well as a variety of donor governments which provided it with equipment, training and financial support. Training, equipment and support have also been provided by the EU and U.S. to AMISOM's troop-contributing countries, Uganda and Burundi, as well as to Somalia's TFG. In recent years, AMISOM troops have received training and support from a U.S.-based private security firm, Bancroft Global Development. Bancroft had been hired by the governments of Uganda and Burundi to train their soldiers, but the U.S. government has since then reimbursed these two countries for this expense, totaling some \$7 million during 2010 and the first half of 2011.<sup>14</sup>

From the start, AMISOM's operations were hampered by a lack of adequate equipment, logistical support and bureaucratic management structures. It was therefore not surprising that it took over four years for it to establish control of Mogadishu. Indeed, for its first three and a half years, it did little more than keep the TFG alive, the air and sea ports open, and hold onto several strategic junctions in the city. In the process, AMISOM has taken significant casu-

## FROM THE START, AMISOM'S OPERATIONS WERE HAMPERED BY A LACK OF ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND BUREAUCRATIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES.

alties: estimates suggest approximately 500 peacekeepers have been killed and many more wounded. Reports indicate that more than 50 AMISOM peacekeepers were killed between mid-February and early March 2011 alone when they conducted a major offensive against *al-Shabaab* forces.<sup>15</sup> In another major incident, this time after *al-Shabaab*'s ostensible expulsion from Mogadishu, a contingent of Burundian soldiers suffered heavy casualties when they found themselves exposed in the city's Dayniile district. Although the total number of fatalities is disputed (claims from each side ranged between 10 and 70 Burundian deaths), following the battle, *al-Shabaab* forces paraded the corpses of some two-dozen men dressed in military fatigues.<sup>16</sup> AMISOM's casualty figures are not publicly available, on the grounds that they would lower morale in the mission and bolster its opponents.

Since 2008, AMISOM's activities on land have taken place in parallel with a set of maritime security operations aimed at combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. These have been undertaken by the European Union (EUNAVFOR), NATO, China, India, Russia and Japan, among others.

### *Africa Union- United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)*

Deployed across Darfur, Sudan, UNAMID is currently the UN's largest and most costly mission (at \$1.8bn for FY2010-11). Having arrived in early 2008 to replace the overwhelmed African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004-07), UNAMID is mandated to implement a long and complicated set of tasks relating to the support of the Darfur peace process, the provision of security to its personnel and local civilians, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance throughout Darfur. It currently involves some 18,000 soldiers, 5,000 police officers and 4,000 civilian personnel. UNAMID's principal troop contributors are African, specifically Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, South Africa, and Burkina Faso.

UNAMID's central challenges have stemmed from its non-permissive environment. The peacekeepers are thinly stretched across a very large area with harsh climatic conditions, poor roads and infrastructure, and limited local resources. Politically, the environment is also difficult. The central problem is the fact that since the collapse of the Darfur Peace Agreement in mid-2006 there has been no effective peace settlement for Darfur's conflict. Instead, there have been an intermittent series of talks brokered by Qatar. Numerous conflict parties have intermittently pulled out of, and then later re-engaged in, these talks. As discussed below, a peace deal was finally agreed between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) in July 2011, but the other major rebel movements did not sign. UNAMID has also struggled to implement its broad mandate in the face of intransigence and obstructionism from the Sudanese authorities, which has led to restrictions on its movements. It has also faced significant gaps in its capabilities. It has been particularly short of attack and military utility helicopters, armored personnel carriers, as well as suffering shortfalls in

communications, intelligence-gathering, and logistical capabilities.

Some good news for UNAMID is that the number of large-scale engagements between the government and rebel forces has declined significantly in recent years, although localized armed clashes continue. Instead, more of the recent violent episodes have been related to inter-tribal conflicts and clashes, usually over natural resources, and criminal activities, primarily banditry (see **Section 3**). While most violence is not directed at UNAMID forces, 7 peacekeepers were killed during 2010 and the same number from January to July 2011.<sup>17</sup>

UNAMID's current operations revolve around achieving four central objectives: 1) to ensure the Government, armed groups and other non-State actors fulfill their responsibility to protect civilians, in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law; 2) to protect civilians from physical acts of violence; 3) to ensure freedom of access to the populations at risk; and 4) to prevent violations of human rights and ensure effective response, particularly with regard to women and children. The peacekeepers are significantly increasing the number of their patrols, they are engaging in a variety of Quick Impact Projects to deliver relief supplies, vaccinations and educational and shelter materials to hard to access populations, and the mission has developed a situational awareness and early warning system which issues weekly analytical protection of civilian reports.<sup>18</sup>

### *UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)*

The UNMIS was deployed to Sudan in 2005 to assist in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of IDPs and refugees; assist in demining efforts; and contribute to the protection of civilians and human rights (see Security Council Resolution 1590). It had an authorized strength of approximately 10,000 troops,

700 police, and 4,000 civilian personnel with the principal troop contributors being India, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kenya, Zambia and China. Like the UNAMID operation in Darfur, UNMIS personnel struggled to cope with the harsh environment, obstructionist tactics from the authorities in Khartoum, and a series of violent clashes, especially around the Abyei area. These and other attacks on civilians in Southern Kordofan prompted criticisms that UNMIS personnel were not doing enough to enforce their mandate to protect civilians.<sup>19</sup> With the winding down of the CPA implementation period the UN considered a variety of contingency plans to ensure that some form of peacekeeping mission would continue after the birth of the new Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011.<sup>20</sup> In the event, UNMIS was forced to withdraw from the north after the authorities in Khartoum withdrew their consent for the mission to continue.

In its place came the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). This has the strategic objective of supporting the new state in meeting political, security and protection challenges and thereby assisting the state-building process. UNMISS has an authorized strength of 7,000 troops and up to 900 police officers. As of late October, just under 5,500 uniformed personnel had been deployed, the principal troop contributing countries being India, Bangladesh, Kenya and China. It has been mandated for an initial period of one year to, among other things, consolidate peace in the new state as a prerequisite for state-building and economic development; support the government authorities exercise their responsibilities to prevent and mitigate armed conflict as well as protect civilians (for which it has authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter); and assist in the establishment of the rule of law and security sector reform. The Government of South Sudan was reluctant to consent to a Chapter VII mandate for UNMISS to protect civilians, seeing its primary problem lying with the contested northern border rather than internal political divides. But the UN pushed hard and eventually achieved

authorization to use force under Chapter VII. One source of controversy has been the extent to which the UN's Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Hilde Johnson, who was heavily engaged in the CPA negotiation process, remains too supportive of the SPLM. This will become particularly sensitive should UNMISS be required to act in a mediatory capacity between Juba and Khartoum over border disputes, or if the SPLM does not allow political pluralism to flourish within the new southern state.

Among the principal challenges facing UNMISS are how to support the authorities of the new Republic of South Sudan extend their control across the entire territory; how to help facilitate a resolution to the disputed areas of the border between north and South Sudan (see also UNISFA below); how to support but simultaneously reform the SPLA; and how to protect civilians. Protecting civilians will be particularly difficult given the multiple sources of current and potential threats against them. As one analysis summarized, civilians are at risk from North versus South violence, especially around the Abyei area; conflict between the SPLA and other armed groups in the south; abuses by the South Sudan security forces; inter-communal violence involving tribal clashes, usually about localized resources; intra-community violence against certain segments of that community or individuals within it, such as sexual violence or revenge killings; and threats from foreign armed actors, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (discussed below).<sup>21</sup>

### *United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)*

As discussed in more detail below, the Abyei area has been the central crucible of violent clashes along the contested border between north and south Sudan. Although the reasons are complex, the presence of large quantities of oil, the contested nature of the boundaries of the area itself, and the relationship between sedentary and pastoralist communities have combined to make the

region particularly valuable and hence tense. In late June 2011, UNISFA was established in the aftermath of the latest wave of violence to sweep across the Abyei area. The mission was established after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops monitor the area as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. This agreement appears to owe its existence to persistent Ethiopian diplomacy with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi making several trips to Sudan to seal the deal.

Although 22 countries have provided uniformed personnel, the vast majority of UNISFA's authorized troop strength of 4,200 is Ethiopian, although by late October just under 2,900 had deployed. The force is mandated to verify the demilitarization process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; ensure the security of the region's oil infrastructure; and to "protect civilians in the Abyei area under imminent threat of physical violence". Although the details of the negotiations are unclear, Ethiopia was clearly worried about the potential for wider regional destabilization, should continuing violence in Abyei produce a renewed war between north and south Sudan. Unfortunately, the arrival of UNISFA troops did not end the violence and in early August four Ethiopian soldiers died after a landmine exploded while they were on patrol. The deaths were particularly controversial because three of the Ethiopian peacekeepers died of their wounds while waiting for several hours for the authorities in Khartoum to grant the UN helicopter they were in permission to travel.<sup>22</sup> The main problem was the refusal of the Sudanese Army to vacate the positions it had captured in Abyei and hence allow the return of the many thousands of people displaced by the earlier violence. The Sudanese Army argued that the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement meant that its soldiers did not have to withdraw until the Ethiopian peacekeeping force had deployed in full strength. UN representatives contested this inter-

pretation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. It was also clear at the time of the agreement and initial deployment that the Ethiopian government expected the belligerent forces to have withdrawn before its peacekeepers arrived.<sup>23</sup>

## Peace Processes

The region's peace processes are in poor health. The most positive news is from Kenya – where the national political dialogue continues – from Eritrea and Djibouti – whose border conflict has been stalled – and from eastern Sudan – where a fragile agreement is holding. In contrast, the Algiers Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains unimplemented after more than a decade, there is no genuinely nationwide peace process in Somalia (there is only an unimplemented road map to smooth the end of the transitional government's transitional status), the Doha peace process on Darfur has concluded without an effective settlement of the conflict, and the recent deal to

### Peace Processes in the Horn

- CPA Process: fragile progress but endpoint unclear. Recent Abyei Agreement unimplemented.
- Doha Process: partial agreement without key rebels; now finished.
- Eastern Sudan: steady progress.
- Algiers Agreement: unimplemented.
- Eritrea-Djibouti: holding.
- Somalia: no peace process and the new road map to end the transitional government remains unimplemented.
- Kenya Dialogue: holding.



stabilize the Abyei area between north and south Sudan is already being challenged by the authorities in Khartoum.

In Sudan, three peace processes have run concurrently in recent years: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between north and south; the Doha process on Darfur, and the efforts to implement a peace deal in the east of the country. Compared to the widespread concerns in late 2010 that the final stages of the CPA implementation would spark renewed warfare, the outlook from October 2011 is relatively positive. The most worrying period of violence between northern and southern forces did not occur immediately around the southern referendum, but rather in May and June in the Abyei area and further south in Unity state. As noted above, this promoted an Ethiopian-brokered deal and the deployment of the UNISFA. However, that deal has not been implemented and outstanding issues remain, notably how to manage the contested areas of the border between the two Sudan's and how to strike a deal on oil production and export.

In the east of Sudan, efforts continue to keep the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) on track. Signed between the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Front in mid-October 2006, the ESPA provided for, among other things, the establishment of a special Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund with \$600m allocated for 2007-11; a guaranteed share of positions in government institutions at the federal and state levels for the people of Eastern Sudan; affirmative action programmes for the region incorporated into national socio-economic development plans; greater control for local authorities over land issues and assurances of compensation for people affected by land development; gradual change in land tenure law towards integration of customary laws and traditional practices; the use of local languages in primary education and the media; and a commitment on the part of the federal government of Sudan to prioritize education in Eastern Sudan. The most notable

recent development was the December 1-2, 2010 donor conference which took place in Kuwait to support the deal's implementation. The conference raised pledges of some \$3.5 billion for projects in water, education, health, infrastructure, capacity development, and microfinance.<sup>24</sup>

In relation to Darfur, the focus for the last two years has been on Doha, Qatar. Critics pointed out that the talks there were generating little more than big bills spent on keeping some 280 rebel "delegates" in five-star luxury hotels in Doha and apparently giving them nearly an additional \$10,000 a day in per diems.<sup>25</sup> The talks also stimulated tensions within the AU when in mid-April 2011, the joint chief mediator of the talks, Djibrill Bassolé, was criticized by the AU Peace and Security Council for disregarding its directives on the need to coordinate his activities with the AU's High-Level Panel on Darfur led by Thabo Mbeki. This was somewhat difficult since by late 2010 Mbeki's panel had clearly switched its focus to the CPA implementation process and had come out in favor of Khartoum's proposal to "domesticate" the Darfur peace process, much to the annoyance of several of the rebel groups. As a result, the AU's criticism of Bassolé prompted the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) to release a joint statement supporting his mediation efforts, which they said had "achieved considerable progress."<sup>26</sup>

It took until mid-April 2011 for the participants in Doha to focus their discussions on a specific document. Agreement was reached on three of the document's original six chapters but the rebels were unhappy with both its substance and the way in which it was compiled and the outstanding issues could not be overcome.<sup>27</sup> On May 1, JEM officially rejected the deal. The basic division at the talks revolved around the Government of Sudan's desire to "domesticate" the solution to Darfur's conflict, while the rebels sought to internationalize it through guarantees provided by external actors. Debate also continued over how any agreement on

Darfur – the formal focus of the Doha process – should relate to the other problems in northern Sudan and hence whether it should be part of a broader national constitutional reform package.

Another sticking point was over Darfur's representation in any new national political dispensation: the JEM rebels wanted northern Sudan split into six regions, each with a vice-president, and a rotating federal presidency. They also wanted compensation for victims of the war, resolution of land disputes, and mechanisms to resolve justice issues, especially accountability for crimes. In early June 2011, the JEM delivered a revised version of the Draft Darfur Peace Document as a basis for moving forward.<sup>28</sup> This was rejected by the Government.

On July 14, however, the Government of Sudan signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur with a single Darfur rebel group – the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM).<sup>29</sup> It also signed a separate protocol on LJM's political participation and the integration of the movement's limited forces into the national army. Neither the JEM nor the two major SLA factions (led by Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi respectively) signed. The agreement did leave a three-month window for the inclusion of other rebel groups which refused to sign. However, JEM insisted the entire process needed to be reopened for discussion while Khartoum considered the existing document to be the final deal on offer. This led one U.S.-based NGO to place the blame for failure squarely on Khartoum:

"True to form, the government is thus removing the possibility of meaningful negotiations with a group whose buy-in is necessary for ending conflict in Darfur, while claiming that it is genuinely seeking peace."<sup>30</sup>

Unhappy at this dismal outcome, the U.S. senior adviser on Darfur, Dane Smith, met with JEM representatives in London to persuade them to participate in a Darfur Forum in Washington DC later in the year. Not surprisingly, this idea was promptly rejected by the authorities in Khartoum.

Although all negotiations in Doha had ceased, the Doha Document continued to generate differences of opinion within the JEM. These came to a head when the movement's deputy leader, Mohammad Bahr Hamdeen, tried to establish a new group with the intention of negotiating with the Government – he was promptly sacked by JEM's leader, Khalil Ibrahim. The authorities in Khartoum have stated their refusal to negotiate outside of Sudan and reiterated that the Doha Document is the only deal on offer.

Sudan's peace processes have also been influenced by several ongoing cases being investigated by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). In early 2007, after a referral by the UN Security Council in March 2005, the ICC prosecutor launched investigations against Ahmad Muhammad Harun, a senior Sudanese government official, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, an alleged leader of the *janjawiid*. In March 2009, the ICC's prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for Sudan's President Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. In July 2010, this was revised to cover not only crimes against humanity and war crimes, but also genocide. It remains to be seen how international attempts to engage with al Bashir, in light of the ICC warrant, will affect Sudan's conflict dynamics. Since mid-2009, the prosecutor has also begun organizing cases against Abdallah Bandar Abakaer Nourain, a commander in the JEM and United Resistance Front; and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, a former member of Sudan Liberation Army-Unity and now the JEM.

In Kenya, the primary issue has been the ongoing efforts to implement the 2008 National Dialogue and Reconciliation Agreement mediated by Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities in the wake of the electoral-related violence. This entailed the establishment and consolidation of a new political dispensation that culminated in the signing into law of the country's new constitution in August 2010 as a basis for promoting sustainable peace, justice and development.

The situation was further complicated in March 2010 with the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to authorize the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the violence. In early 2011, the ICC prosecutor initiated cases against senior supporters of both Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.<sup>31</sup> Concerns remain that while presidential elections are scheduled for December 2012 the underlying problems which generated violence in 2007-08 have not been resolved.

In the Ethiopia-Eritrea case, the Algiers Agreement (2000) remains unimplemented. Having expelled the United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNMEE, from its territory in mid-2008, Eritrea retains a deep sense of injustice that the border demarcation process concluded by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) has not been implemented on the ground. Asmara sees this as evidence that the UN and other external actors are unwilling to uphold the rule of law, except when it suits their political interests. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has rejected its obligations under the international legal arbitration and instead used its political and military dominance to stymie the border demarcation process, impose sanctions upon Eritrea, and try to reopen a broader package of fundamental issues related to the now poisonous relationship between the regimes in Addis and Asmara. In this regard, it should be recalled that shortly after gaining statehood, the Republic of South Sudan offered to act as a mediator to facilitate a settlement of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute.

Better news has emerged in Djibouti-Eritrea relations, specifically, the signing of the June 2010 peace deal brokered by Qatar concerning the border dispute that had erupted between the two states in early 2008. The deal included the creation of a committee consisting of one participant from each country as well as one from Qatar. Parties committed to providing lists of prisoners of war and missing persons. Qatar agreed to monitor the border until a settlement is reached. So far, this remains in place.

In Somalia, by contrast, a peace process exists only on paper in the form of the Djibouti Agreements (2008, 2009). In reality, the TFG only managed to broker a fragile deal with *Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma* (ASWJ) and with the authorities in Puntland, but both of those alliances disintegrated. The primary focus of the TFG's supporters has been on consolidating their power in the face of various opponents rather than engaging in peacemaking and reconciliation activities. Indeed, by mid-May 2011, the UN's special representative, Augustine Mahiga, publicly acknowledged that the TFG had "not succeeded in undertaking any political reforms that would inject new momentum into the process."<sup>32</sup> Mahiga emphasized the lack of political will within the TFG stating, "The problem is that neither Parliament nor the Government want change. ... that is the crux of the paralysis."<sup>33</sup> This echoed an earlier analysis by the International Crisis Group which concluded,

"Unless by August 2011, when its mandate expires, the TFG clearly demonstrates new signs of life – that is, credible outreach and reconciliation efforts, the willingness to share power with other regions and administrations, serious security sector reform and government restructuring and a genuine effort to combat corruption – the international community should withdraw its support and direct it instead at those administrations that are serving the interests of the Somali people."<sup>34</sup>

Similarly, in June, Hillary Clinton bluntly told the TFG that "it cannot continue to operate the way it has in the past."<sup>35</sup> Arguably the most damning assessment, however, came in July 2011 from the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia. This concluded,

"The principal impediments to security and stabilization in southern Somalia are the Transitional Federal Government

leadership's lack of vision or cohesion, its endemic corruption and its failure to advance the political process. Arguably even more damaging is the Government's active resistance to engagement with or the empowerment of local, *de facto* political and military forces elsewhere in the country. Instead, attempts by the Government's leadership to monopolize power and resources have aggravated frictions within the transitional federal institutions, obstructed the transitional process and crippled the war against Al-Shabaab, while diverting attention and assistance away from positive developments elsewhere in the country."<sup>36</sup>

The outcome of the subsequent debates was a road map which sought to end the transitional period in Somali politics by focusing on four priority tasks before August 2012: security, the constitution, reconciliation, and good governance. In effect, it granted the TFG a one-year potential stay of execution. But the road map was also little more than international recognition of the facts on the ground, which were that the TFG had granted itself an extension in office several months earlier without waiting for any international approval. The principles for the road map's implementation were defined as:

- Somali ownership – they would be led by the TFG and the preference would be to hold all meetings inside Somalia;
- inclusivity and participation – they would involve all sectors of society (elders, women, youth), regional entities, civil society organizations as well as religious and business leaders;
- the meetings would be well resourced, by following a Resource Mobilization Plan which made international financial sup-

port contingent on seeing results related to the four priority tasks; and

- that the roadmap would be monitored on a regular basis to ensure compliance.

The next consultative meeting of the parties is scheduled to take place in Puntland in late 2011. Sceptics dubbed the plan a “roadmap to nowhere,” noting that it was not inclusive enough to include the authorities in Somaliland or the *Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen* and the Resource Mobilization Plan provided external donors with an easy get-out clause to avoid funding the TFG when it failed to deliver reforms.<sup>37</sup> This is widely viewed as the TFG's last chance to perform.

That the Horn has witnessed numerous peace initiatives points to the worrying conclusion that lack of international engagement is not the crux of the problem. Rather, a significant part of the problem is the type of engagement that has occurred has not built stable peace. One common criticism of external peacemaking efforts has been the tendency to impose arbitrary deadlines, often tied to financing what Sally Healy has called “deadline diplomacy.”<sup>38</sup> On occasion, the region's peace processes have been little more than a façade for armed groups that believe they benefit more from continued conflict than from peace.


## SECTION 2: WEBS OF CONFLICT IN THE HORN (AND BEYOND)

If the preceding discussion provides a reasonable snapshot of the central features of the Horn’s current conflict terrain, how should analysis aimed at fostering dialogue about conflict resolution and peacebuilding proceed? In 2009, three respected academic analysts concluded that “one central characteristic of the Horn is that analysis can start with any conflict situation . . . and map out a trail linking to other countries and their internal or bilateral conflicts.”<sup>39</sup> This is a useful insight for advocates of peacebuilding and conflict resolution inasmuch as solutions to one conflict may have positive knock-on effects for others. But it also complicates the exercise because it raises the fundamental question of *how* these conflicts are interrelated.

Analysts who address this problem have usually focused on dynamics at the regional level and hence described the Horn of Africa as a “regional

security complex.”<sup>40</sup> Following Barry Buzan’s work, a regional security complex is defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”<sup>41</sup> More recently, Buzan and Ole Wæver revised their definition to suggest regional security complexes are “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.”<sup>42</sup> They are both socially constructed (i.e. “they are contingent on the security practice of the actors”) and “mutually exclusive” in a geographical sense.<sup>43</sup> Buzan and Wæver integrate the involvement of external actors in a regional security complex via their concepts of “penetration” and “overlay.”<sup>44</sup>

Figure 1: Patterns of Regional Security Post-Cold War<sup>45</sup>



In this framework, the Horn of Africa is described as a “proto-complex” characterized by the existence of “sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but when the regional dynamics are still too thin and too weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged regional security complex.”<sup>46</sup> Their general conclusions about Africa are twofold. First, non-state actors have a large impact on the continent’s security dynamics.<sup>47</sup> Second, “the framework of notional interstate boundaries may be more misleading than helpful as a way of understanding the security actors and dynamics in play.”<sup>48</sup>

While the idea of a regional security complex is helpful in some respects, it is too simplistic inasmuch as it captures only part of the relevant conflict and security dynamics in the Horn. In practice, the Horn’s conflicts are not just regionalized – they are also often localized, nationalized and globalized all at the same time. Consequently, the region is the site of multiple interrelated security complexes which operate at a variety of levels.

To understand the multiple interrelationships, networks, processes and structures evident across the Horn’s conflicts, it is helpful to revisit what international relations scholars refer to as the “levels-of-analysis” problem.<sup>49</sup> This allows us to recognize that the conflicts in the Horn are complex social processes which are *simultaneously*, but to varying degrees, local, national, regional and global.

Within academic international relations, the levels-of-analysis *problem* is generally thought to revolve around “how to identify and treat different types of location in which sources of explanation for observed phenomena can be found.”<sup>50</sup> In this sense, there are actually two problems: first, how to locate and identify the relevant levels, and second, deciding how explanatory weight should be distributed among them. Consequently, there exists what might be called a “levels-of analysis” problem and a “levels-of-explanation” problem.<sup>51</sup>

This paper identifies four distinct levels which are of most direct relevance for understanding the dynamics of political violence in the Horn of

**Table 1: Levels-of-analysis and Political Violence in the Horn of Africa**

| Level-of-analysis | Description  |
|-------------------|--|
| <b>Local</b>      | Relations between individuals and their immediate (sub-state) politico-geographic context.                                     |
| <b>National</b>   | Focused on the institutions of state power.  |
| <b>Regional</b>   | Geographically coherent, sub-global security complexes which involve the agents of at least two states.                        |
| <b>Global</b>     | De-territorialized networks, structures, processes, institutions or belief systems (with the potential to be global in scope). |

Africa: local, national, regional and global (summarized in table 1). There is no “individual level ... since individuals feature in every level and are tied into their social contexts”.<sup>52</sup> Nor is there a “bureaucratic level” about which a similar point could be made: all social formations – including tribes, religious sects, insurgencies, firms, states and international institutions – could be understood as involving some type of formal or informal officials, administrators and bureaucrats.

### Local Wars

The region’s wars all have local roots, that is, their origins lie in the relationships between individuals and their immediate politico-geographic context. In spatial terms, this immediate context is defined as sub-state to separate it from national level dynamics (discussed below). In many of the Horn’s conflicts, local agendas and the contours of domestic politics played decisive roles. These agendas have taken a variety of forms, including a sense of entitlement to land and other resources, attempts to control systems of governance in particular towns and localities, as well as questions about identity, belonging and citizenship. Violence has thus flared around issues such as local election results, political appointments to public office, cattle rustling, competition for access to pasturage, and water sources, between agriculturalists and pastoralists.


With regard to the onset of war, the importance of local, sub-state dynamics has been affirmed in statistical analyses across a range of cases. Using data collected from first-level administrative units in 22 African states (rather than national-level data), one study showed that armed conflict was more likely to occur in sub-state regions that lacked education services, were relatively deprived compared to the country mean, had strong intra-regional inequalities, and combined the presence of natural resources and relative deprivation.<sup>53</sup> In relation to the dynamics that sustain war, detailed studies of Sudan’s con-

licts, for example, have concluded that local ethnic/tribal/political identity dynamics were crucial to understanding the conflicts’ twists and turns.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, the UN characterized the country’s political transition as being marred by “persistent, localized conflict.”<sup>55</sup> Given the importance of local agendas in the onset and sustenance of conflict, it makes sense that they will also be crucial in ending them as well. More attention must therefore be given to local mechanisms of dispute resolution. The localized distribution of violence across the Horn’s states can be seen quite clearly from emerging data-sets such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).<sup>56</sup> Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of violent episodes in Ethiopia and Sudan between 2008 and 2010.

### National Wars

Although many regimes in Africa’s weak states have often found it difficult to effectively broadcast their power far beyond the capital city and other strategic locales, struggles to control state institutions have at times been crucial for understanding why wars began and how they unfolded.<sup>57</sup> Capturing the capital city as a route to claiming sovereignty has been a central goal of rebel groups in Africa over the last 50 years.<sup>58</sup> Capturing the state has been important for several reasons, not least the resources that can accrue to regimes from bilateral donors and the international financial institutions, the diplomatic recognition that allows a regime to select its individual representatives in many international organizations, and the fact that the first generation of leaders in Africa’s independent states decided to retain the continent’s colonial boundaries as their own. Although few insurgencies now seriously threaten to overthrow incumbent regimes, they exert localized violence in large part to gain a greater say in national political decisions, often related to resource allocation.

**Figure 2: ACLED Ethiopia 2008-10 (312 violent events) and Sudan 2008-10 (614 violent events)**



With regard to the outbreak of conflict, national level factors are often crucial because, as Christopher Clapham put it, “The place to start trying to understand any political crisis is always with the government in power.”<sup>59</sup> This insight also finds support in more quantitative studies. For example, one recent analysis of all ethnic groups worldwide between 1946 and 2005 concluded that exclusion from state power was a crucial factor in whether ethnic groups started rebellions, especially if this was combined with prior experience of conflict and the group’s potential to mobilize support was high.<sup>60</sup> This suggests that conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives must take account of national governance structures and how central institutions relate to more local settings in war-torn states.

### Regional Wars

As discussed above, particularly since the end of the Cold War, regional developments have also been identified as crucial for understanding contemporary security dynamics in Africa and elsewhere (see

figure 1). The Horn is no different and the importance of its regional political geography has been intensified by three main factors: (1) military inefficiency (in the sense that most of the region’s militaries could not easily project power well beyond their national borders); (2) the disjuncture between political identities and state/political boundaries; and (3) the combination of weak states with porous borders. In the Horn, regional dynamics have assumed different forms. Sometimes government forces have crossed into neighboring states to eliminate rebel bases and supply lines, to intimidate countries which gave sanctuary to rebels, or conversely to support incumbent regimes against insurgents. These tactics have produced a regular stream of IDPs and refugees, with the resulting camps often becoming potential pools for rebel recruitment. In the case of the Horn, there are also intensifying linkages with developments in other regions, including the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Yemen, and with Chad and the Central African Republic.



**Global Wars**

Despite the stubborn prevalence of the view that Africa is the place that globalization forgot, in reality the continent and its conflicts have all been deeply affected by an array of globalizing structures, networks, processes, institutions and belief systems. At an abstract level, international processes have long played a crucial role in perpetuating (and often escalating) conflicts in three main ways: (1) they have affected the dynamics of state behavior and civil wars by conferring statehood on some entities and not others; (2) they have sustained particular models of appropriate state structures; and (3) they have diffused cultural scripts which have informed and guided state behavior.<sup>61</sup> These globalizing dynamics are exemplified in what Thomas Callaghy and his colleagues called “transboundary formations,” which link the local to the global through an array of structures, networks and discourses that ultimately produce and/or sustain forms of authority and order.<sup>62</sup> Whether analysis focuses on diaspora politics, the diffusion of religious belief systems, the trade in small arms and light weapons or the trade in khat, the Horn’s conflicts are intimately bound up with a wide range of globalizing processes.

## SECTION 3: KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

As discussed in **Sections 1 and 2**, the Horn suffers from complex webs of interlocking armed conflicts. Six of the key threads that link many of these conflicts are the following cross-cutting issues:

1. Authoritarian and overly militarized governance structures;
2. ongoing patterns of mutual destabilization;
3. the centrality of local (sub-state) dynamics;
4. the importance of the region's borderlands and frontier zones;
5. the impact of resources, particularly land, oil, and water; and
6. the significant roles played by diaspora groups.

This section briefly discusses each of these six issues in turn. It should also be recalled that all the region's states have been deeply affected by the legacies of colonialism. Various forms of imperial rule have influenced, among other things, governance structures and political borders across the Horn. Yet while colonial legacies are an important underlying factor in explaining the region's politics, they are neither a principal trigger nor sufficient explanation for any of the Horn's contemporary armed conflicts. As a consequence, they are not discussed as a separate cross-cutting theme. Rather, where colonial legacies have been particularly important in specific cases they are discussed in relation to those wars.

### Governance

Governance structures in the Horn have regularly been authoritarian, heavily militarized and have contributed to high levels of political marginalization and economic inequalities. In particular, with the partial exception of Kenya, none of the region's ruling regimes have permitted the growth of genuinely independent judicial, security or media institutions, nor have they facilitated genuine space in

which civil society groups can flourish. Instead, narrow agendas aimed at preserving regime security have generally trumped calls for policies aimed at promoting genuinely national or human security.

Although the meaning of the concept of governance remains widely debated, it is used here to refer to public and private institutions, structures and mechanisms, including but not limited to the official system of national governments and political parties geared toward the management and regulation of populations that are intended to produce at least a minimal degree of routine and order. At its core, governance is about conflict management among diverse populations. In the Horn, one of the basic cleavages in the region is between Islamic and Christian cultures, and in some states this fact has exercised a considerable stranglehold on what governance and legal structures are considered legitimate by local populations.

Defined in this manner, governance lies at the heart of every one of the Horn's armed conflicts. As Terrence Lyons has argued,

“Governance that blocks the aspirations of significant constituencies is central to the shift from less violent forms of contentious politics to widespread armed conflict. Civil wars last because alternative systems of governance are established that reward strategies of violence and predation and those militarized organizations that thrive in a context of fear and insecurity. The governance question is also at the core of the process to end the war and create new institutions that can demilitarize politics and sustain long-term peacebuilding.”<sup>63</sup>

Reforming governance structures must therefore be part of any peacebuilding and conflict resolution strategies. Indeed, Lyons has also made the persuasive case that in essence the management of post-war contexts should be conceptualized as a process

of demilitarizing governance structures, especially where this involves turning insurgency movements into political parties which are content to pursue power through the ballot box rather than the barrel of a gun.<sup>64</sup>

Contemporary government structures across the Horn remain repressive and have contributed to a woeful set of regional (under)development statis-

tics. Table 2 summarizes some of the more prominent indices of governance for the Horn's seven states. They are particularly poor and oppressive in Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, although none of the region's states do well in global terms.

In terms of economic growth and development, the Horn has not been helped by difficult climatic conditions and the recent global recession, which

**Table 2: Measures of Governance in the IGAD States<sup>65</sup>**

|   | Djibouti  | Eritrea   | Ethiopia  | Kenya       | Somalia  | Sudan    | Uganda      |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------|----------|-------------|
| Failed States Index 2010                          | 74/177    | 36/177    | 15/177    | 14/177      | 1/177    | 3/177    | 21/177      |
| Human Development Index 2010                      | 147/169   | N/A       | 157/169   | 128/169     | N/A      | 154/169  | 143/169     |
| Ibrahim Governance Index 2010 (Africa)            | 30/53     | 50/53     | 35/53     | 26/53       | 53/53    | 47/53    | 24/53       |
| Freedom in the World 2011*                        | Not Free  | Not Free  | Not Free  | Partly Free | Not Free | Not Free | Partly Free |
| Corruption Perceptions Index 2011                 | 91/178    | 123/178   | 116/178   | 154/178     | 178/178  | 172/178  | 127/178     |
| State Fragility Index & Matrix 2009               | Serious   | Serious   | Extreme   | Serious     | Extreme  | Extreme  | High        |
| World Bank, Governance Matters 2009 (Percentiles) |           |           |           |             |          |          |             |
| Voice & Accountability                            | 10th-25th | 0-10th    | 10th-25th | 25th-50th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 25th-50th   |
| Political Stability & Absence of Violence         | 50th-75th | 10th-25th | 0-10th    | 10th-25th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 10th-25th   |
| Government Effectiveness                          | 10th-25th | 0-10th    | 25th-50th | 25th-50th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 25th-50th   |
| Regulatory Quality                                | 25th-50th | 0-10th    | 10th-25th | 25th-50th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 25th-50th   |
| Rule of Law                                       | 25th-50th | 0-10th    | 10th-25th | 10th-25th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 25th-50th   |
| Control of Corruption                             | 50th-75th | 25th-50th | 25th-50th | 10th-25th   | 0-10th   | 0-10th   | 10th-25th   |

\* Somaliland received a "Partly Free" rating.

**Table 3: Net Foreign Direct Investment in the IGAD States, 2006-10 (current U.S. dollars)<sup>65</sup>**

|                 | 2006          | 2007          | 2008          | 2009          | 2010          |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| <b>Djibouti</b> | 108,287,709   | 195,351,140   | 227,654,582   | 96,859,685    | 26,800,434    |
| <b>Eritrea</b>  | 450,000       | -110,000      | -233,333      | 35,556        | No data       |
| <b>Ethiopia</b> | 545,257,102   | 222,000,573   | 108,537,544   | 221,459,581   | 184,000,000   |
| <b>Kenya</b>    | 50,674,725    | 729,044,146   | 95,585,680    | 140,522,653   | 185,793,190   |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 96,000,000    | 141,000,000   | 87,000,000    | 108,000,000   | 112,000,000   |
| <b>Sudan</b>    | 3,534,080,000 | 2,425,590,000 | 2,600,500,000 | 2,682,180,000 | 2,894,378,667 |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 644,262,500   | 792,305,781   | 728,860,901   | 603,749,197   | 817,178,710   |

*Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank data at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD> [Accessed October 30, 2011]*

has led to a drop in remittance flows (especially to Somalia) and a collapse in commodity prices. Nevertheless, for the last seven years, Ethiopia has sustained double-digit economic growth despite fluctuating flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Across the region more generally, FDI flows to the region between 2006 and 2010 have generally been unpredictable and in some cases, notably Ethiopia, falling (see table 3).

External development aid, another significant source of resources for the region's states, is also unpredictable. This has arrived in very large quantities in Ethiopia and Sudan in particular. As table 4

shows, between 2007 and 2009, Eritrea was the only state in the region to see its net development aid flows reduce. Much of this aid comes from Western countries. In the current climate of financial austerity, however, these aid flows may be reduced as Western governments are pressured to cut programs that do not produce demonstrable positive results. This combination of poor and dire statistics provides a significant part of the explanation for why so many populations in the region have tried to develop alternative systems of governance beyond the formal government structures in their country.

**Table 4: Net Official Development Assistance in the IGAD States, 2007-09 (U.S.\$m)<sup>67</sup>**

|                 | 2007  | 2008  | 2009  | Top 5 Donors (2008-09 average)   |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| <b>Djibouti</b> | 112   | 121   | 162   | 1. France<br>2. Japan<br>3. African Development Fund<br>4. Arab countries<br>5. EU                                   |
| <b>Eritrea</b>  | 158   | 144   | 145   | 1. EU<br>2. International Development Assoc.<br>3. Global Fund<br>4. Japan<br>5. Israel                              |
| <b>Ethiopia</b> | 2,578 | 3,328 | 3,825 | 1. International Development Assoc.<br>2. United States<br>3. EU<br>4. United Kingdom<br>5. African Development Fund |
| <b>Kenya</b>    | 1,323 | 1,363 | 1,788 | 1. United States<br>2. International Development Assoc.<br>3. United Kingdom<br>4. IMF<br>5. Germany                 |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 384   | 758   | 662   | 1. United States<br>2. EU<br>3. United Kingdom<br>4. Norway<br>5. Spain  |
| <b>Sudan</b>    | 2,112 | 2,384 | 2,289 | 1. United States<br>2. EU<br>3. United Kingdom<br>4. Netherlands<br>5. Japan   |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 1,737 | 1,641 | 1,786 | 1. United States<br>2. International Development Assoc.<br>3. EU<br>4. African Development Fund<br>5. United Kingdom |

In addition to providing little space for political freedoms or promoting genuinely national development, some of the region’s governments are also heavily militarized. Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti in particular invest large portions of their limited resources to sustain relatively large armed forces (see the estimates provided in table 5 and figure 3). The armed forces in all three states have tended


to be deployed to suppress domestic opposition groups more often than to defend the state from external aggression, although admittedly each state has recently faced external threats. Despite the large number of armed forces it is notable that in the post-Cold War period the Horn has witnessed relatively few coups compared to the rest of the African continent.

**Table 5: Estimates of the Official Armed Forces in the Horn of Africa, 2010<sup>68</sup>**

|                         | Djibouti | Eritrea | Ethiopia | Kenya  | Somalia TFG | Somalia Puntland | Somalia Somaliland | Sudan Govt | Sudan SPLA | Uganda |
|-------------------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|-------------|------------------|--------------------|------------|------------|--------|
| Army                    | 8,000    | 200,000 | 135,000  | 20,000 | 2,000       |                  | 15,000             | 105,000    | 140,000    | 45,000 |
| Air Force               | 250      | 350     | 3,000    | 2,500  |             |                  |                    | 3,000      |            |        |
| Coast Guard             |          |         |          |        |             | 5,000-10,000     | 350                |            |            |        |
| Gendarmerie             | 2,000    |         |          |        |             |                  |                    |            |            |        |
| National Security Force | 2,500    |         |          |        |             |                  |                    |            |            |        |
| Navy                    | 200      | 1,400   |          | 1,620  |             |                  |                    | 1,300      |            |        |
| Paramilitary            |          |         |          | 5,000  |             |                  |                    | 17,500     |            | 1,800  |

**Figure 3: Annual Military Expenditure in the IGAD States (U.S. \$ millions constant 2009 prices)<sup>69</sup>**


(Note: No line indicates that data was unavailable)



As depicted in figure 4, SIPRI figures for the military expenditure expressed as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the region's states highlight several conclusions. First, there are severe gaps in the available data – there are no reliable figures for Somalia and current 2009 figures are only available for three states (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda). Second, until data became unavailable, between 1998 and 2003, Eritrea was spend-

ing between one-fifth and one-third of its entire GDP on its military; far more than any other state in the region. The next most heavily militarized states were Sudan and Djibouti. Third, most other states in the region were spending around 1-2% of their GDP on military expenditures. By way of comparison, most European states spend less than 2% of their GDP on military expenditures.

**Figure 4: Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP<sup>70</sup>**



**Mutual Destabilization**

The logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has become deeply embedded into the political fabric of the Horn of Africa. It is not at all clear what positive benefits this mentality has generated but in the name of short-term regime/group survival policies based on this logic have produced a long history of opposition movements setting up proto-governments in exile, organizing among refugees and exiled communities, and establishing sanctuaries and bases from which they operated across the border and back into the motherland. Importantly, as Lionel Cliffe observed, “such activities were only possible if neigh-

bouring regimes encouraged or allowed or, at the least, were powerless to prevent them.”<sup>71</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the award for supporting the most armed factions in neighboring states goes to the regime in Khartoum, although the Eritrean regime is catching up. Perhaps surprisingly given the Islamist rhetoric which so often flowed from al-Bashir’s regime, it has adopted a truly pragmatic approach supporting armed groups in the region with agendas ranging from Islamist to secular and – in the case of the LRA – a strange mixture of religious and secular beliefs. But the difference between Khartoum’s policies and those

of most other states in the region has been only a matter of degree rather than one of principle.

Most recently, it is Eritrea which has come under most scrutiny (and sanctions) for its support to rebel groups primarily in Somalia and Ethiopia (see **Section 1**). According to one analyst, Eritrea's destabilization tactics are an attempt to deliver a message that says "If it does not get help in resolving its problem with Ethiopia it will create problems for others."<sup>49</sup> In Somalia at least, what seems to have gotten Eritrea in trouble is not the fact that it provided arms to non-governmental actors, but that it supported the wrong non-governmental actors – particularly those like *al-Shabaab* which developed ties with *al-Qa'ida* – and played a rather poor game of international diplomacy. Ethiopia and Kenya have both provided weapons and assistance to non-governmental groups in Somalia, and hence are also presumably guilty of breaching the UN arms embargo. However, whereas Ethiopia's support for AWJS and Kenya's Jubaland Initiative were apparently compatible with international efforts to consolidate the TFG, Eritrea's activities were intended to undermine it and supported a brand of extremism that did not play well either in the region or among Western governments. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have also been seen to play more constructive security roles in the region, par-

ticularly related to counter-terrorism and in contributions to peacekeeping.

## Local Dynamics

As noted in **Section 2**, local dynamics and agendas are crucial to understanding the intricacies of any armed conflict. They are particularly important when external actors lack serious leverage over the belligerent parties, as is the case across much of the Horn. These localized agendas have often revolved around a sense of entitlement to land and attempts to control systems of governance, as well as questions about identity, belonging and citizenship. **Section 4** discusses some of the most significant examples of this with respect to the Horn's contemporary conflicts. But there are also some important demographic factors that shape the structural contexts in which local actors operate. This is not to argue that demographic factors are a principal cause of warfare but they do set the structural context in which armed conflicts play out and hence will influence their dynamics.

Arguably, the two principal demographic trends across the Horn are: (1) rapid increases in populations with large proportions of youth and (2) significant growth in urbanization within those populations. Growing populations do not automatically

**Table 6: Population statistics in the Horn of Africa, 2008<sup>73</sup>**

|                 | Mid-2008 Population (millions) | Percentage of Population |           |          | Percentage Living In                |                               | Natural Increase in Population (annual %) | Increase in Urban Population (annual %) | Total Fertility Rate |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---|----------------------|
|                 |                                | <Age 5                   | Ages 5-14 | Ages 65+ | Urban Areas (% of total population) | Slums (% of urban population) |   |   |                      |
| <b>Djibouti</b> | 0.8                            | 13                       | 25        | 3        | 86                                  | --                            | 1.8                                       | 2.6                                     | 4.2                  |
| <b>Eritrea</b>  | 5.0                            | 17                       | 26        | 2        | 19                                  | --                            | 3.0                                       | 5.9                                     | 5.3                  |
| <b>Ethiopia</b> | 79.1                           | 17                       | 28        | 3        | 16                                  | 82                            | 2.5                                       | 4.1                                     | 5.3                  |
| <b>Kenya</b>    | 38                             | 17                       | 26        | 3        | 21                                  | 55                            | 2.8                                       | 3.6                                     | 4.9                  |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 9.0                            | 18                       | 26        | 3        | 35                                  | --                            | 2.7                                       | 4.1                                     | 6.7                  |
| <b>Sudan</b>    | 39.4                           | 15                       | 26        | 4        | 41                                  | 94                            | 2.1                                       | 4.5                                     | 4.5                  |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 29.2                           | 20                       | 30        | 3        | 13                                  | 67                            | 3.1                                       | 3.9                                     | 6.7                  |



generate greater risks of conflict, but they will put extra pressure on scarce resources. The fact that a growing proportion of the region's population will be young people also puts a premium on creating employment and educational opportunities. Indeed, it is the demographic structure of national populations rather than their rate of growth per se that has been most closely associated with patterns of instability.<sup>74</sup> Given the recent evidence from the popular revolutions across north Africa and the Middle East, it is increasingly concerning that most countries in the Horn are poorly prepared to cope with these challenges.

As table 6 highlights, the region's rapid urbanization means that many of its people will be slum-dwellers, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan. This is concerning for a number of security, governance and developmental reasons. To take just one example, it is evident from the violence which followed Kenya's disputed elections in 2007–08, the poverty and health issues in Nairobi's Kibera slum, and the official anxiety about *al-Shabaab* sympathizers operating out of Nairobi's Eastleigh district, that slums pose a range of governance, development and security-related challenges for the region's governments.<sup>75</sup> Table 6 also makes apparent the structural futility built into Eritrea's attempts to wage war

against Ethiopia, a country with a population more than fifteen times bigger than its own (see **Section 3**).

People in Kenya and Uganda also suffer from high rates of HIV/AIDS, with young women suffering from a disproportionately higher infection rate than men (see table 7).<sup>76</sup> Among other problems, it has been suggested that the HIV/AIDS epidemic partly explains the decline of agricultural production in some areas, the dwindling numbers of rural school teachers, and the growing population of orphans across the region.<sup>77</sup>

### Frontiers and Borderlands

The region's frontier zones and borderlands have long been a source of particular problems. First, some contested political borders have helped generate armed conflict. The largest conflicts with an explicit focus on territory were those fought between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977–78) and Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998–2000), but one might also classify elements of the SPLM as fighting a war of secession. This problem was exacerbated by the impact of colonialism, which left the Horn with several imprecise political borders that split apart people with shared ethnic identities or forced different ethnicities to live in the same sovereign state.

**Table 7: HIV/AIDS rates in the Horn, 2008**


|                 | % of Population Ages 15-19 w/ HIV/AIDS | % Ages 15-19 w/ HIV/AIDS |       |
|-----------------|--|--------------------------|-------|
|                 |  | Men                      | Women |
| <b>Djibouti</b> | 3.1                                    | 0.7                      | 2.1   |
| <b>Eritrea</b>  | 1.3                                    | 0.3                      | 0.9   |
| <b>Ethiopia</b> | 2.1                                    | 0.5                      | 1.5   |
| <b>Kenya</b>    | 7.8                                    | 1.7                      | 6.5   |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 0.5                                    | 0.6                      | 0.3   |
| <b>Sudan</b>    | 1.4                                    | 0.3                      | 1.0   |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 5.4                                    | 1.3                      | 3.9   |

The case of some 2 million Afar people whose homeland straddles Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia is just one example of how the potential for conflict has been exacerbated, where groups split apart by colonial borders have become minority political constituencies in what they consider to be somebody else's state.<sup>78</sup> A big part of the boundary headaches that have faced Ethiopia, for example, stem from the fact that the Italian colonists never clearly demarcated the borders.

Nevertheless, compared with other regions of Africa, which also suffered from similar problems, the Horn's governments have a poor historical track record of resolving their border disputes peacefully

(West Africa, for instance, has had far more border disputes than the Horn, but protagonists there have resolved most of them peacefully, including through the use of judicial arbitration). Other border-related flashpoints include the frontier between Eritrea and Djibouti, which saw violence erupt in 2008 and the more regularly low-intensity conflict between Somaliland and Puntland. Violence has also recently occurred across some of the contested border areas between North and South Sudan (see figure 5 and Appendix D). Even when border-related violence does not break out, the Horn's frontier zones are home to some huge displaced populations, with many people stuck in refugee

Figure 5: Summary of North-South Sudan Border Contestations<sup>79</sup>



camps such as Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya. Such camps pose huge challenges for the people trapped within them and the host state authorities.

A second problem concerns the porosity of many of the region's borders rather than their demarcation. Here the issue is that the region's governments have often lacked the capacity to effectively police their boundaries and stop flows of unwanted people (e.g. insurgents and criminals) and/or illicit goods (e.g. small arms and narcotics). The borders between Sudan-Chad, Ethiopia-Somalia, and Sudan-Uganda-DRC have proved particularly difficult to police for insurgent and criminal activity. One recent example came in the Kenya-Somalia frontier zone in October 2011. Following the famine-induced mass exodus of refugees streaming across the Somali-Kenya border and the kidnapping of several foreign nationals along the same frontier, Kenyan authorities increased fortifications along the border and deployed troops into Somalia to with the stated aim of preventing *al-Shabaab* operations in Kenya by creating a buffer zone up to the settlement of Afmadow. In other cases, it is the fact that political borders artificially dissect the seasonal migration routes of nomadic and pastoralist peoples. This has led to tension in various parts of Sudan, notably during the seasonal migrations south of northern groups, such as the Misseriya from Kordofan and the Rizeigat of Southern Darfur who move into Bahr al Ghazal.

On the other hand, there is a good case to be made that in the parts of the region where such circumstances apply, international borders should remain open, partly as a practical necessity given the lack of official border control capabilities and partly because of the negative repercussions that would follow if traditional patterns of population movements were curtailed. Across parts of Sudan, for example, the idea of international "separation" is unfamiliar within populations who have interacted for centuries without any significant local administration or border governance.<sup>80</sup> As Douglas Johnson has argued, occasionally, when dealing with ill-defined

and insubstantial international borders such as that between north and south Sudan, "ambiguity and neglect can lead to a kind of stability."<sup>81</sup>

A third specific challenge in some of the region's frontier zones is cattle raiding, which is linked to traditional pastoralist practices, environmental conditions, and the influx of modern technologies such as telecommunications and assault weapons. Indeed, pastoralist communities in the Horn have been dubbed "climate change canaries" by one international NGO because of the close association between their lifestyles and environmental conditions.<sup>82</sup> Within the Horn's pastoralist communities a distinction is often drawn between the theft and raiding of livestock. Whereas theft involves individuals acting without the permission of their elders, raiding is considered a far more legitimate activity of taking something – in this case livestock – by force. Traditionally, raiding has played a particularly important role in rites of passage for young men and in measuring bride price, so it is significant in part because of the status accrued by acquiring cattle. While historically raiding was based on established norms and principles, in the modern era it has become a much more predatory activity which has grown in its scale and potential for violence. One driver of this increase is the growing commercialization of cattle rustling linked to foreign markets which has led to what one analysis called "livestock warlord rivalry," perhaps most notably around the area known as the Karamoja Cluster in the frontier zones linking Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda.<sup>83</sup> This type of violence is also evident across large swathes of southern Sudan. Indeed, in August 2011, reports emerged from Jonglei state that an estimated 600 people had been killed and nearly 1,000 wounded in fighting which took place when Murle raiders attacked Luo Nuer areas and obtained some 40,000 livestock. This was in response to an earlier raid by the Luo Nuer against the Murle.<sup>84</sup>

## Resources

Although often described as “natural,” resources are not natural, they are socially constructed. Naturally occurring objects become resources when they enable actors to achieve their objectives. Consequently, some phenomena are useful for fulfilling material needs (e.g. water, arable land) whereas others are perceived as valuable because of the social construction of “value” (e.g. diamonds, coltan). Resources thus *enable* particular actions but they are not a cause of human behavior itself. Understood in this manner, it becomes clear that armed conflicts cannot be fought without resources – such as people, guns, ammunition, supplies, training, money etc. It therefore makes no analytical sense to talk of “resource wars” because there is no such thing as a war that does not involve resources, or “non-resource wars.”<sup>85</sup> In the contemporary politics of the Horn, three enablers have been considered particularly important for a variety of reasons and have been regularly linked to armed conflict: land, oil and water.

## Land

Although the quantitative academic literature on the causes of civil war has not identified land as a central issue, it is clearly at the heart of many conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As the AU High-Level Panel was regularly told by Darfuris: “Land was one of the root causes of the war ... and it remains a key issue in future negotiations.”<sup>86</sup> But not just any land; at stake are the most useful parts of the continent, what French colonists referred to as *Afrique utile*. This land has been described as “undoubtedly the most important natural resource in Africa.”<sup>87</sup> Naturally, different groups consider different pieces of land important for different reasons; for example, territory might be considered crucial because of what it represents, such as a national homeland, or for what commodities are located there, or because of its agricultural fertility. The Ogaden region is one particularly contested area

where many such issues intersect: it has long been the subject of national liberation struggles by its inhabitants as well as inter-state conflicts; it contains much fertile land for agriculture and grazing; and it houses significant oil, gas and mineral deposits.

Land is crucial to the Horn’s politics for several reasons. First, most other resources are found on or in it. Control of land is hence vital for many types of commodity extraction. Second, much of the region’s economic activity remains based in agriculture and forms of pastoralism with all that this implies for the centrality of land. Third, some areas have important symbolic value, such as homelands, or spiritual value, like sacred places that should be preserved for future generations.

In academic literature, land ownership, management and control have been linked to conflict in various ways: scarcity of useful land, conflicting laws governing land tenure, boundary disputes and conflicting claims over specific portions of land, arguments over “landlord-tenant” arrangements, racial imbalance of land ownership, the clash of spiritual considerations with economic and political realities, complaints over government regulation policies, increasing population densities especially when a rapid influx of outsiders occurs, and land-labour relations.<sup>88</sup>

These possible routes to violence have appeared unevenly across the Horn. But to take one prominent example, land has certainly been at the heart of many of Sudan’s violent episodes. The UN Environment Program, for example, concluded that 29 of the 40 violent local conflicts in Darfur since independence in 1956 involved grazing and water rights.<sup>89</sup> In this context it is important to note that in accordance with the provisions of the CPA, southern Sudan established a Land Commission in 2006 and enacted a Lands Act in 2009 which revoked all existing national land laws. The process of developing land policies to guide the implementation of the Act is underway, but incomplete.

## Oil

The Horn's most significant oil-related conflict dynamics are between North and South Sudan but there are also other areas where low-level violence has been linked to oil and gas exploration, notably in eastern Ethiopia and in the *Sool* and *Sanaag* disputed regions of Somaliland/Puntland. The exploration of oil in Uganda is quite likely to entrench that country's dominant political elite and the corruption that has been associated with them.


Oil has been the single biggest factor in the growth of Sudan's economy for the last decade. Sudan currently ranks as sub-Saharan Africa's third largest oil producer after Nigeria and Angola. But with the majority of Sudanese people employed in agriculture most of them have seen little benefit from the country's oil wealth, which has mainly been spent in and around Khartoum. Throughout the entire CPA process oil has dominated the Wealth Sharing Protocol, and arguably the entire transitional enterprise. It is probably no exaggeration to say that if the authorities in northern and southern Sudan can conclude a workable deal over oil they will avoid a return to war; if they cannot, such a conflict becomes much more likely. This is partly because both regimes are largely dependent on oil revenues –indeed the authorities in South Sudan have no other significant sources of domestic revenue.

Today, debate continues about the future of oil politics in Sudan. The good news is that it is so clearly evident that the governments in both the north and south need a healthy petroleum sector in order to flourish that this shared interest provides a powerful incentive for cooperation between them. On the other hand, for many of the communities who inhabit Sudan's oil-producing areas, the development of the country's oil industry has brought disruption, dislocation, violence, degradation and pollution with few fringe benefits.<sup>90</sup> Many of Sudan's oil deposits, especially the majority of the better quality Nile Blend crude (as opposed to the

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poorer quality Dar Blend), are located in the heavily militarized and contested border regions, including in the Three Areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile). Figure 6 shows some of the problems of the combustible mix of oil and border demarcation politics in the contested region of Abyei (see also figure 7). In particular, the Permanent Court of Arbitration border definition of July 2009 differed substantially from the 2005 Abyei Boundary Commission ruling, thereby placing the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields outside of the Abyei area with the Diffra oil field remaining within.

In early 2009, most estimates suggested Sudan had oil reserves of 5 billion barrels with the potential for an additional 1.6 billion in recoverable reserves.<sup>91</sup> One estimate in the *Oil and Gas Journal* suggests Sudan has less than three decades of oil left.<sup>92</sup> The best hopes for new deposits are in Jonglei and Lakes State, and offshore in the Red Sea; but overall the exploration results outside of South-Kordofan and Upper Nile have been disappointing. If a comprehensive and effective deal is to take hold between the North and South then it will be imperative that both sides have access to a full package of information about the oil industry (although naturally some information regarding Sudan's oil potential remains unavailable pending

Figure 6: Oil, Politics and Borders in Abyei Area<sup>95</sup>

further exploration). Given the amount of manipulation of information that has surrounded Sudan's oil politics over the last few years this will not be an easy obstacle to overcome.<sup>93</sup> As one report put it, "Sudan's oil industry remains poorly supervised and highly politicized."<sup>94</sup> Part of the problem for the new Republic of South Sudan is that upon gaining independence it inherited contracts and all the rights and duties they entail without possessing sufficient human resources to deal with them. Similar question marks hang over Nile-Pet, the South's oil company.

One suggestion has been to base the post-independence oil deal around a "fee-for-service" model involving the south paying to use the North's infrastructure in the pursuit of export guarantees with joint oversight and sound financial arrangements. To be workable and stable, such a deal must also involve the demilitarization of the oil areas so that workers can carry out operations safely and securely.<sup>96</sup> Another suggestion has been to extend the logic of the CPA's Wealth Sharing Protocol to cover all national oil resources, known and unknown, on shore and off shore rather than on the deposits in Unity and Southern Kordofan. Whatever the deal's dynamics, greater levels of environmental manage-

ment are needed to reverse the existing negative impacts of oil exploration across the two states.<sup>97</sup>

### Water

Water resources are related to conflict dynamics in the Horn at two principal levels: the local and the regional. At the local level, access to water has been a common source of tension between farmers and pastoralist groups, as well as between communities which inhabit areas around shrinking water courses and lakes, such as Lake Al Abyad in Southern Kordofan, Sudan. At the regional level similar dynamics apply – related to water access, usage, and contamination – but they are played out as part of the region's international politics. By far the greatest concern in this regard is the politics of water in the Nile Basin. While some of the principal cases of localized water-related conflicts are discussed in **Section 3**, primarily related to some conflict dynamics in parts of Sudan, this section focuses on the case of the Nile.

Until July 2011, the Nile River Basin's ten riparian states were Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Egypt (10%), Ethiopia

(12%) and Sudan (63%) accounted for 85% of the territory that constitutes the hydrologic boundaries of the basin (see Appendix E). The first thing to note is that the Nile's waters draw Egypt into the Horn's security dynamics as a crucial player because they are vital for its survival (the dynamics are not as strong with regard to the DRC, Eritrea, Rwanda and Burundi so they will not be discussed here). Second, with the independence of South Sudan the Nile Basin now has a new user. It has also just witnessed regime change in one of its major users (Egypt).

There are four main development needs concerning water use in the Nile Basin: water for irrigation and hydroelectric power production; prevention of floods; watershed management, minimization of erosion and siltation of reservoirs; and prevention of water pollution.<sup>98</sup> Political challenges arise when a dichotomy emerges between national and environmental system boundaries. Unfortunately, "National politics in the Nile Basin have continually ignored the fact that the peoples of the Nile Basin are bound together by shared environmental resources."<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, arguably the most thorough study of the issues to date concluded "that the problem of international water conflicts is not one of war, but rather unsustainable development resulting from the absence of cooperation. Poverty, migration and intra-national conflicts may follow."<sup>100</sup>

The principal political controversy stems from Egypt's 1959 deal with Sudan which gave the two downstream countries effective control of the Nile waters (Egypt 75%, Sudan 25%). Since then, Egypt has made repeated statements about its readiness to use military force to protect its share of the river's water. Today, the potential for conflict over the Nile waters revolves around the following factors:

1. There are finite water resources, but the region's population is increasing.
2. The Nile states are not well equipped to find alternatives to present water use trends.
3. There is no agreement on water allocation between the riparian countries that is accepted by all.
4. There is a history of diplomatic tensions, especially between Egypt and Ethiopia.
5. International investment in water resource development has been blocked, due to disagreement between the countries.
6. The downstream riparian states fear a reduced water flow due to upstream water resource development.
7. The upstream riparian states are concerned about the downstream countries hindering their water resource development.<sup>101</sup>

In May 2010, a new dynamic was introduced when Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Ethiopia unveiled plans for a new treaty which would overturn Egypt's veto rights on river projects and the 90% control provision. Egypt and Sudan boycotted the ceremony. Eritrea and south Sudan were permitted to observe the Nile Basin process, but not participate as negotiating parties. Shortly after the ceremony Kenya signed the agreement and in late February 2011, Burundi became the sixth Nile state to agree to the new deal. This paved the way for the ratification of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, which will then create the Nile Basin Commission to decide on river projects in the region. It remains unclear how the recent political upheaval in Egypt will impact upon this process.

Recent tensions have also arisen over Ethiopia's construction work on the Blue Nile, which has concerned Egypt and Sudan.<sup>102</sup> An overview of hydropower development activities in Ethiopia and Sudan is provided in Appendix F. Ethiopia's aim was recently summarized by the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn as being "to increase power generation" via hydro-

electric power.<sup>103</sup> He added that this was “not consumptive, the water returns to its course after producing power.” The Minister also stressed that

“...the Nile Basin Initiative does no harm to the Egyptians but the problem with them is that they don’t want to see Ethiopia develop. Why should they hamper us from developing our hydropower potential? There is no reason. ... We don’t think that Egypt will go to war for securing its benefit. War can destabilise all, not just Ethiopia, and there has never been any history of successful war with Ethiopia. We feel that they won’t go for that. Some people are raising the idea of water wars, but that would benefit no one. What would benefit all of us would be a cooperative agreement. ... This is the only way that we can have a win-win benefit.”

## Diasporas

The final key cross-cutting theme discussed here is the significance of diaspora populations for conflict dynamics in the Horn. Of course, diaspora groups are never monolithic and, hence, it is unwise to place much stock in any generalizations. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, it is necessary to briefly sketch some areas in which diaspora groups have played important roles.

First, it is important to emphasize that with the exception of Djibouti, the Horn’s states all have relatively large and politically active diaspora populations. These populations are, in a sense, a direct by-product of the logic of mutual destabilization and the webs of conflict discussed above. This phenomenon is hardly unique to the Horn, but the region has generated some large diaspora populations both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, one 2007 estimate put the Ethiopian community in the U.S. at 73,000, rising to 460,000 if second and subsequent generations were included.<sup>104</sup> It is

now thought to be well over 500,000.<sup>105</sup> In relative terms, the extreme case is Somalia where such a significant proportion of its population (at least 2 million people) has left the country after decades of political turmoil that Ken Menkhaus observed how the nation had effectively “diasporized.” The difficulty, of course, comes in estimating how many of the total diaspora population are actively engaged in politics.

Second, of most interest here are “conflict-generated diaspora groups” – networks of individuals forced to leave their home state by conflict or repression who frequently have a specific set of traumatic memories and therefore retain strong symbolic ties to their homeland.<sup>106</sup> These groups use transnational, regional, and globalized networks to focus on localized issues through a mixture of direct, indirect and advocacy-related activities.

A third characteristic is the protean quality of diaspora groups in relation to the political economy of the region’s web of conflicts. On the one hand, by providing remittances which often represent a crucial source of external revenue for the Horn’s governments – and the authorities in Somaliland – they can play an important role in boosting the homeland economy and, in some instances, promoting development. The regime in Eritrea, for example, continues to rely upon such remittances and maintains an incredible stranglehold over its diaspora, not least by threatening the lives of family members who remain within Eritrea. The UN Monitoring Group has referred to this as a “diaspora tax” whereby the authorities in Asmara levy a 2% income tax on the estimated 1.2 million Eritrean nationals – or 25% of the total population – living abroad.<sup>107</sup> On the other hand, these groups can also fuel the machinery of oppression and war economies. In the Eritrean case this is often done reluctantly and in full knowledge of the use to which their monies are put.<sup>108</sup> But on other occasions diaspora groups have deliberately fuelled armed conflicts by supporting one side or another. Indeed, based on his study of Ethiopia, Lyons con-



cluded, “Conflict-generated diasporas tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts.”<sup>109</sup> One example is the Sool Sanaag Cayn Army which emerged in late 2007 in relation to the conflict over the contested regions between Somaliland and Puntland. According to the UN Monitoring Group, this “army” was disturbing evidence of the “diasporization of the Somali conflict” since it had been “largely conceived, funded and led by members of the Somali diaspora, who have appropriated legitimate local grievances to advance personal political ambitions and – in some cases – to enrich themselves.”<sup>110</sup>

A fourth, and related point, is that these groups can play important roles in influencing how conflicts are framed by outsiders, especially those groups that organize in influential cities such as Washington, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Addis Ababa, Nairobi etc. And in several cases, members of the diaspora have succeeded in achieving positions of high office upon their return to their homeland. Somalia’s TFG, for example, contains many personalities from the diaspora.

Moving forward, the Horn’s diaspora groups need to think hard about the leverage they possess both in relation to the region’s states and local non-state actors as well as with the U.S. government. These diaspora groups should also take the following steps.<sup>111</sup>

First, they should study examples of how other diaspora populations have effectively influenced U.S. foreign policy, including the Jews, Armenians, and Irish. This will involve learning lessons about how successful groups frame their objectives in relation to the relevant parts of the U.S. government and act accordingly. Second, they need to engage in a degree of internal conflict resolution amongst themselves in order to establish some shared values, principles, and priorities. Third, they should articulate their concerns in terms of themes

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which resonate across the region rather than focusing on more parochial or politically sectarian interests and issues. While broad appeals to peace and justice can be helpful, more focused themes for the Horn specifically might usefully include respect for international law abroad as well as respect for the rule of law at home, security sector reform, good governance, and increased participation of women in peace and security issues. Once these themes have been articulated, diaspora groups should look for ways to establish and institutionalize forums in which dialogue about such issues can be sustained. Ultimately, the goal must be to open up greater space for civil society groups to operate within the region’s states.

## SECTION 4: KEYSTONE CONFLICTS

Writing in early 2007, Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen drew attention to two principal clusters of conflicts which destabilized the Horn: the interlocking rebellions in Sudan and the cluster which links the festering dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the power struggle in Somalia.<sup>112</sup> Although certain dynamics have altered, four years later their analysis remains correct inasmuch as the region's principal conflicts still revolve around political relationships within Sudan and Somalia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But such broad brush strokes obscure as much as they reveal. For the purposes of this paper, eight clusters of distinct, but related, armed conflicts can be identified:

1. the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia;
2. the cluster of conflicts centered on Somalia;
3. tensions between the new state of South Sudan and its northern neighbor;
4. conflicts within South Sudan;
5. conflicts within north Sudan;
6. conflicts within Ethiopia;<sup>113</sup>
7. the wandering trail of destruction cut by the LRA across South Sudan and elsewhere; and
8. the low-intensity conflicts concerning armed cattle-raiding clustered in the frontier zones at the nexus of the Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Sudanese borders.

While all these conflicts are significant, this section focuses on providing a short overview of the first five conflict clusters listed above that have the potential to generate the most serious negative consequences for the region as a whole. A comprehensive mapping exercise would need to analyze all these conflicts as would any attempts at devising a regional conflict resolution strategy. It is also

important to note that it is exceedingly difficult to gain an accurate understanding of what is happening on the ground in many of these conflict zones, in part because governments restrict access to outsiders, and in part because of the propaganda wars which swirl around all armed conflicts.

### Eritrea-Ethiopia

The ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has quite rightly been described as “a major fulcrum” in the region's politics.<sup>114</sup> It has generated many destructive efforts at mutual destabilization which have infected the wider region. It should be an international priority to close out the Algiers Agreement, one way or another, and restore good relations between these two states. Both regimes would stand to benefit significantly in economic and political terms by restoring a constructive relationship. This would also have hugely positive ripple effects for the wider region and attempts to promote effective regionalism and economic integration. In practice, however, the two regimes have continued to engage in unhelpful “war talk” which makes the political climate less conducive to reconciliatory initiatives. For example, Ethiopia's announcement on April 15, 2011 that it would use “any means at its disposal” to remove the incumbent regime in Asmara was entirely unhelpful, as was the Eritrean response that such statements amounted to “pure aggression and a declaration of war,” as if it had done nothing to stoke such rhetoric.

In retrospect, it was clearly an error not to physically demarcate the border between the two countries in the immediate aftermath of Eritrea's independence when relations between Addis and Asmara were strong. Since then, the Algiers Agreement has been left in tatters and the conflict has become much more than just an issue of border demarcation; it has become a matter of national pride and personal honor for both regimes and, to a lesser extent, their populations. It will therefore

be difficult to engineer a settlement while both regimes maintain their current attitude.

Of course, Ethiopia did not have to sign the legal arbitration entailed in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). But having done so, its refusal to implement the ruling looks churlish, especially given the rulings in its favor on the issues of reparations and the *casus belli*.<sup>115</sup> It also badly undermines the status of international legal principles in the region. Put simply, on the boundary demarcation, Eritrea's position "is legally compelling. International conventions cannot and should not be disregarded with impunity."<sup>116</sup> Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that Ethiopia will submit to this ruling while Meles remains in power.

For one thing, Ethiopia can endure the stalemate far better than Eritrea. While Ethiopia's economy has witnessed a relative boom – the regime claims double-digit growth for the last seven years in a row – Eritrea faces a stagnating economy which has been saved by gold sales and diaspora contributions, and has attempted to generate additional cash by exporting arms and destabilization to the wider region. As noted above, this has made it the target of international sanctions, which further impoverishes its suffering population.

Second, this is a hugely sensitive issue in Ethiopian domestic politics and Meles has come under considerable criticism for signing up to the Algiers Agreement, thereby squandering the fruits of military victory. Such sentiments feed into more general strains of criticism against the current regime, notably in the country's major towns and among a variety of "nationalities" where the regime has failed to stop low-intensity violence (e.g. the Afar, Oromo and Ogaden).

Third are the various criticisms raised against the EEBC, and in particular whether it over-stepped the terms of its legal mandate and whether it should not have encouraged more political dialogue over what to do with populations in the contested border zone.<sup>117</sup> Among other things, the EEBC – which disbanded in November 2007 without see-

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ing the border demarcated on the ground – has been criticized for producing situations of forced citizenship or removal, such as in the central zone territory of Alitena to Eritrea when its inhabitants are clearly Ethiopian.<sup>118</sup>

A fourth issue is that there is almost no international pressure on Meles Zenawi to implement the EEBC decision. This is in large part due to his regime's deft international diplomacy where he has played a key role with respect to some important regional and international issues: Meles was a member of Tony Blair's Commission for Africa; he has presented himself as a staunch ally against terrorism; Ethiopia houses the African Union and has made significant contributions to UN and AU peacekeeping operations; and Meles occupies the leading role in African attempts to negotiate an international deal on climate change issues.

Ethiopia's position on the conflict with its neighbor was recently summarized by the Foreign Minister and contained the usual caveats: "Our Eritrea policy is very clear. These two peoples are very friendly; the normalising of relations, also with the governments, should come as soon as possible. We have accepted unconditionally the rulings of the Boundary Commission [on the border] and so this has to be implemented, but with a discussion because the implementation process needs something on the ground since it is a colonial rather than a people's boundary."<sup>119</sup>

For its part, the Eritrean government feels misunderstood, victimized, and isolated. This has encouraged the regime's unhelpful tendency to engage in what one commentator called displays of "righteous anger."<sup>120</sup> These sentiments derive in large part from a long-held perception of "betrayal and neglect, wilful or otherwise, by the international community."<sup>121</sup> Despite its military defeat, Eritrea negotiated a deal whereby the border would be delineated by an expert commission on the basis of colonial conventions. Having seen the EEBC ruling go largely in its favor, the failure of the UN and other international actors to then help implement the decision eventually frustrated the Eritrean regime to such a degree that in mid-2008 it expelled the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMEE). In its broader foreign policies, Asmara has now turned away from the West and sought to construct a network of international partners including northern Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Iran and the League of Arab States.<sup>122</sup>

The conflict between the two regimes is further complicated by the incredibly repressive nature of the current Eritrean government towards its own population. Indeed, the UN Monitoring Group recently described Eritrea as possessing "the most highly centralized, militarized and authoritarian system of government on the African continent."<sup>123</sup>

Or as one respected analyst put it, Eritrea had become "Africa's North Korea."<sup>124</sup> This degree of isolation has fuelled anti-Western vitriol, which is common in the Eritrean state media.<sup>125</sup> In addition, within six years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Eritrea went from being an important potential ally in the U.S.-led "Global War on Terror" to a state that was seen as decidedly uncooperative. (There was also a widespread perception within Eritrea that the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, was promoting a policy of regime change.) The third and related aspect is the way in which Isaias Afwerki has used the specter of external threats, principally Ethiopia but also the U.S., to keep Eritrean society highly milita-

rized and to crack down viciously on internal dissent. Still the most important episode in this saga occurred on September 18-19, 2001 when Isaias purged the Group of 15 signatories of the so-called Berlin Manifesto letter (basically a call for democratic reforms) which had been delivered to him in October 2000.

This is the context in which Eritrea has fomented conflict with Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Isaias' inner circle now seems to be driven by a version of radical nationalism which emphasizes Machiavellian pragmatism rather than ideological rigidity.<sup>126</sup> All significant foreign policy decisions emerge from the President's Office and are difficult for outsiders to trace. This makes it difficult for external analysts to discern any strategic goals of Eritrean foreign policy other than regime survival and acting as a thorn in Ethiopia's side.

## Somalia

Somalia is currently suffering from several interconnected conflicts. In recent years, its political and conflict dynamics have been shaped by several different types of actors, principally: (1) the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its security forces; (2) the so-called regional or provincial administrations, such as Somaliland, Puntland, *Galmudug*, and *Ximan iyo Xeeb*; (3) armed factions, principally *Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jamaa* (ASWJ), *al-Shabaab* and *Hizbul Islam*; (4) clans and traditional religious leaders; (5) diaspora groups; and (6) secular leaders, most of whom have by now left the country.

Somalia's conflict dynamics tend to spill into the region primarily as a result of the idea of "Greater Somalia" and the Somali populations scattered across Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. International efforts have repeatedly focused on the apparent need to construct a central state government in Mogadishu. Despite having a long history of persistent failure, such attempts continue. Arguably the most recent victim was the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Amedou Ould-Abdallah

(Sept 2007–July 2010), who eventually departed having failed to make any discernible positive impact on the political dynamics within or beyond Somalia. As noted in **Section 1**, by May 2011, his replacement, Augustine Mahiga, had concluded that the peace process was going nowhere; in large part because of a lack of political will within the TFG. He therefore devoted his energies to devising a road map that would bring an end to the country’s transitional period. That road is proving to be littered with obstacles.

These conflicts have produced a dire humanitarian situation. As of September 2011, UNHCR estimated that approximately 910,000 Somali refugees were dispersed around the region (see table 8) while a further 1.5 million remained displaced within Somalia, mainly around Mogadishu and the south of the country. Importantly, humanitarian access was negligible south of Galgaduud (with partial exception of parts of Gedo) but much better north of Mudug and reasonably unrestricted in large parts of Somaliland.<sup>127</sup> More than any other city, events in Mogadishu have had the most significant impact on whether these numbers rose or fell in any given month. This, in turn, was linked to the waxing and waning fortunes of the struggles to control the city waged by the TFG/AMISOM and its opponents, principally *al-Shabaab*. Since *al-Shabaab*’s ostensible departure from the city in August, the city’s population has swelled once more and provided a much needed gateway to access many people affected by the famine.

The most serious conflict in terms of casualties and population displacement has been the struggle to control Mogadishu between Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed’s version of the TFG and the various factions of *al-Shabaab*. The TFG is comprised of some 550 parliamentarians, many of whom are abroad, lack identifiable constituencies within

Somalia, and are widely perceived to be dominated by the Hawiye/Abgal clan faction. Despite the large numbers of parliamentarians, it has been rare for meetings of the parliament to achieve a quorum. The TFG was originally installed in Mogadishu in December 2006 by Ethiopian troops. Since the withdrawal of the Ethiopian army in early 2009, the government has been protected by AMISOM troops and its own security forces (predominantly Banadir regional forces). The TFG’s security forces have been trained and equipped by several foreign initiatives, but with few significant results. By early 2011, initiatives carried out by U.S.-funded contractors, the French military, and the EU had provided training to over 9,000 soldiers for the TFG, yet fewer than 1,000 had remained loyal to the regime – the others returned to their clans, melted away, or quickly joined the TFG’s opponents taking their tactical intelligence with them.<sup>128</sup> The TFG’s position was not helped when in early June 2011 it became embroiled in a financial scandal when reports surfaced that over \$70 million of donations from Arab states had gone unaccounted for.<sup>129</sup> As noted in **Section 1**, until mid-2011, AMISOM and TFG forces struggled to maintain a stalemate in Mogadishu against the forces of *al-Shabaab*, which had controlled about 40% of the city including the notorious Bakara market.

**Table 8: Distribution of Somali Refugees (Source: UNHCR, Sept. 21, 2011)**

| State        | Total # of Refugees | Refugees influx Jan-Sept. 2011 |
|--------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Djibouti     | 17,908              | 3,692                          |
| Ethiopia     | 183,373             | 102,126                        |
| Kenya        | 497,187             | 145,414                        |
| Yemen        | 193,698             | 13,357                         |
| Others       | 17,306              | 17,306                         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>909,472</b>      | <b>264,589</b>                 |

Since Sheik Sharif assumed the presidency of the TFG in early 2009, his government failed to create lasting political alliances with other groups. The two exceptions were temporary alliances forged with the regional administration of Puntland and ASWJ. However, both of these broke down. In mid-January 2011, Puntland's Council of Ministers announced a split from the TFG. This was probably because the new U.S. "dual track" policy (September 2010) effectively set the authorities in Puntland and the TFG as direct competitors for U.S. funds.<sup>130</sup> Instability in Puntland derives largely from the strength of criminal gangs and rogue/corrupt elements within the government. By mid-2011 the region was suspected to hold some 660 international hostages, many as a result of the piracy directed from this area.<sup>131</sup>

ASWJ was an old religious group which focused on providing free education in the mosques. But in late 2008 it became involved with armed attempts to resist *al-Shabaab's* efforts to capture the central Somali towns of Dusamareb, Gelinsor and Guricel. Worried about the extreme Islamist agenda being pushed by *al-Shabaab*, ASWJ allowed militia fighters raised by a group of *Habir-Gedr* businessmen to operate under its official banner in order to resist. These fighters also received support from Ethiopian troops stationed in Galgadud and Mudug. Since then, ASWJ has continued to rely on Ethiopian military and financial support. After ASWJ broke off its agreement with the TFG in mid-2010, any such military support has presumably been in breach of the UN arms embargo on Somalia which forbids weapons being transferred to groups not formally allied to the TFG. (The same could also be said for Kenya's "Jubaland Initiative" which was an attempt to dislodge *al-Shabaab* from the Juba and Gedo regions.<sup>132</sup>)

The fact that both the authorities in Puntland and the ASWJ are part of the Roadmap (September 2011) to end the transition in Somalia suggests that there are at least some serious efforts to patch up their differences with the TFG.

The TFG's principal opponents remain those individuals operating as part of *al-Shabaab*. Formally established in 2003 in Somaliland, the name *al-Shabaab* was not widely used until 2007. From the start, *al-Shabaab* has been plagued by factionalism, but it has gradually increased its extremist rhetoric and ties to *al-Qa'ida*; in 2008 it was designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and in 2009 it released a video pledging support to Osama bin Laden. Although it seems clear that *al-Shabaab* is not under the operational control of *al-Qa'ida*, the exact nature of the practical relationship between the two organizations remains hazy, not least because the latter appears to be operating more as a global brand and/or consultancy firm as much as a concrete organization in places such as Somalia. *Al-Shabaab* has borrowed tactics from insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan and regularly caused casualties among the TFG and AMISOM troops through the use of IEDs, suicide bombings and snipers. The group has also witnessed a prolonged power struggle between its so-called "nationalist" and "transnational" factions (according to some sources, the former are gaining the upper hand).<sup>133</sup> One plausible interpretation of this rift sees it less about ideology and more about gaining control of funds flowing into Somalia from *al-Qa'ida*, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.<sup>134</sup> Since *al-Shabaab's* ostensible departure from Mogadishu it appears that much of its foreign jihadist faction has decamped to Yemen.<sup>135</sup>

Today, *al-Shabaab* is organized in three layers: the top leadership (*qiyadah*), the foreign fighters (*muhajirin*), and local Somali fighters (*ansar*). Estimates of its current military strength range from 3,000–7,000 with perhaps as many as 1,000 fighters hailing from the diaspora. Non-Somali foreign fighters are thought to be between 200–300, primarily from Kenya's Swahili coast, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia.<sup>136</sup> The organization is estimated to generate about \$70–100 million per year in revenue from taxation and extortion in areas under its control,

especially the export of charcoal and contraband into Kenya.<sup>137</sup>

International opinion is divided on whether to engage *al-Shabaab* directly in talks, or indeed whether it would want to. Some external actors regularly talk to all groups in Somalia, such as the League of Arab States. Others are sympathetic to the idea of engaging with elements of *al-Shabaab*, such as Finland, Spain and Turkey. Other states, including the U.S., remain reluctant to participate in any form of substantive engagement.

The most stable part of Somalia has been the regional entity of Somaliland. Having declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, the authorities in Somaliland sought membership in the AU in 2005. The expert panel dispatched to the region by the AU concluded that Somaliland had an exemplary and unique legal case for statehood based on its former existence as a colonial entity and its brief experience of independence over five decades ago. Against all odds, Somaliland has held democratic elections, endured a tricky transfer of presidential power, and has built up some of the trappings of empirical statehood including passports, armed forces and currency. It has gained a good deal of practical recognition in its dealing with Ethiopia in particular, not least because of the importance of the port of Berbera.<sup>138</sup> Authorities in Somaliland clearly want a peaceful southern Somalia but do not want to be a formal part of it. They have experienced some low-intensity conflict with Puntland over the contested eastern border. In addition, a secessionist movement, *Sool, Sanaag and Caayn*, has emerged in this area partly because of concerns about how potential hydrocarbon and oil concessions in the area are being distributed.

The most glaring conclusion to emerge from the last decade of international engagement with Somalia is that external intervention has clearly failed to produce a stable and peaceful country. Not only is Somalia in roughly the same political shape it was in when the UN peacekeeping missions arrived in the early 1990s – although piracy

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has long since spiraled out of control – but the part of Somalia which has been meddled with least by external actors, Somaliland, is the most democratic and stable part of the country.<sup>139</sup> Moreover, when Interpeace conducted a comparative study of internationally-sponsored peace processes and Somali-led processes, the results were instructive: on all the “fundamental aspects of peacemaking,” Somali-led initiatives had “a depth and breadth that is lacking in internationally led processes ... as reflected in the sustainability of the outcomes.”<sup>140</sup> That said, the Interpeace study also concluded that the strength of Somali-led processes was greatest at the local and regional levels and significantly less pronounced at the national level. While this might reflect the fact that most Somalis do not prioritize the resurrection of a central government, it suggests that a hybrid approach is required which blends the best of traditional, civil society and modern techniques of peacemaking and peace-building.<sup>141</sup>

But what might this entail in practice? Here, Ken Menkhaus’ work in particular has raised some sensible questions about the dynamics of, and prospects for, peacebuilding in Somalia.<sup>142</sup> First, it appears that some Somalis have learned to cope so effectively with prolonged state collapse that they no longer have an incentive to take the risks associated with

state-building. As the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia pointed out, by mid-2011, “More than half of Somali territory is controlled by responsible, comparatively stable authorities that have demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to provide relative peace and security to their populations.”<sup>143</sup> As a result, some groups now see the revival of a central Somali state as the central threat to their security; others see it as a means to attract external resources their way. Second, state-building can only work if there is space for a “loyal opposition” and it is hard to see any evidence that this is a widely held concept among Somali leaders. Menkhaus has also shown the dramatic reduction in public confidence in peacebuilding efforts and externally guided reconciliation conferences: these have always generated big disputes over who counts as a representative voice in Somali society and is still manifest in the vitriolic debates about whether to scrap the “4.5 formula.” Indeed, a majority of approximately 650 participants in a recent National Democratic Institute project called for Somalia’s future leaders to be selected on merit, not clan, and expressed a strong desire for Somali-led peace efforts.<sup>144</sup> Fourth, there has been a continual subordination of reconciliation to state-building, in part because of the lack of local ownership over the process. Indeed, many Somali narratives emphasize it is external interference that has gotten them into this mess. Moreover, many youth will long remember that it was Ethiopian military power (with some minor U.S. support) that in late 2006 destroyed the most sustained period of order Mogadishu had seen for years following the victory in June 2006 of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) over the warlords who formerly controlled the city. The two years that followed the Ethiopian incursion (2007–08) saw the highest levels of insurgency and counterinsurgency during Somalia’s twenty years’ crisis. How the ICU brought order to Mogadishu between June and December 2006 and whether it might be replicated should be a key consideration when devising any new approach.

On the positive side, Somalis retain some prominent and relatively effective informal governance systems; some powerful business networks (e.g. in telecommunications, khat, charcoal, and piracy, which if nothing else shows real business acumen under difficult circumstances); a widespread consensus that the foundations of a new political dispensation must relate closely to Islam;<sup>145</sup> a political culture which has a strong pragmatism; a large inflow of remittances; and the ability of people to show great levels of mobility when necessary. All of these capabilities suggest that Somalis can succeed if space can be engineered for them to focus on reconciliation processes.

In light of these points, external efforts should be focused on two principal goals: the provision of humanitarian assistance to Somalia’s desperate civilian population and engineering the political space to conduct an Inter-Somali dialogue, perhaps akin to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which took place in the DRC from 2002. As Ahmed Abdisalam Adan recently put it, “It is only when the legitimate representatives of the Somali communities come together, properly assess their situation, negotiate practical solutions and take collective responsibility for achieving it, that meaningful progress can be expected.”<sup>146</sup> A central problem is whether *al-Shabaab* would participate in such a process and, if not, how to engage the organization. A further problem is how to overcome the effective gutting of Somali civil society which has taken place over the last two decades. Two of the central questions for discussion should be, how do Somalis view the relationship between their primary political, social and national identities and what roles do they want a state government to play in their lives?

### North-South Sudan

While the CPA has rightly been hailed as a major diplomatic achievement, concerns have long been raised that the implementation process often resembled a period of “suspended war” rather than



**Table 9: Results for the Referendum of Southern Sudan<sup>148</sup>**

| Region / State                 | Unity           | Secession          | Invalid | Blank | Votes     |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|---------|-------|-----------|
| <b>South</b>                   | 16,129 (0.43%)  | 3,697,467 (99.57%) | 3,791   | 6,807 | 3,724,194 |
| <b>Central Equatoria</b>       | 4,985 (1.1%)    | 449,311 (98.9%)    | 1,523   | 1,620 | 457,439   |
| <b>Eastern Equatoria</b>       | 246 (0.05%)     | 462,663 (99.95%)   | 70      | 727   | 463,706   |
| <b>Jonglei</b>                 | 111 (0.03%)     | 429,583 (99.97%)   | 124     | 238   | 430,056   |
| <b>Lakes</b>                   | 227 (0.08%)     | 298,214 (99.92%)   | 149     | 450   | 299,040   |
| <b>Northern Bahr El Ghazal</b> | 234 (0.06%)     | 381,141 (99.94%)   | 148     | 526   | 382,049   |
| <b>Unity</b>                   | 90 (0.02%)      | 497,477 (99.98%)   | 166     | 498   | 498,231   |
| <b>Upper Nile</b>              | 1,815 (0.52%)   | 344,671 (99.48%)   | 381     | 523   | 347,390   |
| <b>Warrap</b>                  | 167 (0.04%)     | 468,929 (99.96%)   | 120     | 432   | 469,648   |
| <b>Western Bahr El Ghazal</b>  | 7,237 (4.49%)   | 153,839 (95.51%)   | 728     | 790   | 162,594   |
| <b>Western Equatoria</b>       | 1,017 (0.48%)   | 211,639 (99.52%)   | 382     | 1,003 | 214,041   |
| <b>Other locations</b>         | 28,759 (23.23%) | 95,051 (76.77%)    | 2,431   | 1,559 | 127,800   |
| <b>North</b>                   | 27,918 (42.35%) | 38,003 (57.65%)    | 2,230   | 1,446 | 69,597    |
| <b>OCV</b>                     | 841 (1.45%)     | 57,048 (98.55%)    | 201     | 113   | 58,203    |

genuine preparation for peace.<sup>147</sup> Fortunately, the worst predictions have so far not materialized. Nevertheless, the CPA implementation process has clearly suffered from major problems. The single biggest change in north-south relations is, of course, the prolonged birth of South Sudan following the referendum on southern secession which took place between January 9 and 15. Generally, the period of voting passed off without significant violence (the most serious violent incident occurred on January 9 in Abyei between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Arab militias killing an estimated 20-60 people). The voting process was monitored by over 600 international observers from the EU, AU, IGAD and international NGOs. It was endorsed as free and fair and on February 7, the South Sudan Referendum Commission announced the results: over 97% of the nearly 4 million southern Sudanese voters chose secession (see table 9). That same day, President al Bashir signed a decree accepting the results and confirming his government's willing-

ness to recognize an independent South Sudan at the end of the CPA period on July 9, 2011.

In terms of current conflict dynamics, the central issue is whether southern independence has actually ended the war, or whether it has simply changed the terrain of struggle. Events since mid-2011 suggest the latter. The first point to note is that southern independence has not severed the considerable connections between north and south: in many ways they remain intimately tied together. Not only are the populations deeply mixed but the old habit of mutual destabilization continues with the authorities in Juba supporting the SPLM-North and rebel groups in Darfur, and the authorities in Khartoum backing a range of armed actors in the new Republic of South Sudan. As discussed below, since May 2011, the SAF have clearly adopted a more offensive and militarized approach to dealing with contested issues and parties in Southern Kordofan, Abyei, Blue Nile State and Darfur.


It remains unclear what political fallout al Bashir’s regime will face for “losing the south,” but what is clear is that within the National Congress Party there are increasingly evident disagreements about the best way to deal with the country’s various problems.<sup>149</sup> It is also evident that al Bashir’s regime is struggling economically – foreign currency shortages, rising food prices, corruption, and question marks over how oil revenues will be allocated after the South’s independence – are all eroding the regime’s ability to oil its patronage machine.

Relations between Khartoum and Juba remain tense, but both regimes realize that they need each other to come to a workable arrangement on Sudan’s oil wealth (discussed in **Section 3**). But there are other pragmatic reasons to work together, not least the fact that northern and southern populations remain deeply intermingled. Despite a large number of southerners leaving the north – between

late October and December 2010 approximately 143,000 made the journey south – an estimated 1.5 million southerners remain in northern Sudan.<sup>150</sup> Citizenship arrangements (travel, residency, property ownership, employment, relocation etc.) have been agreed, but their continued implementation will have to be handled carefully.

The other major issue concerns the demarcation of the border between the two states. As noted in **Section 3**, the process of border demarcation remains incomplete and some portions of the boundary are particularly contentious. Violence and tensions have flared intermittently, especially in Abyei where relations between the two major ethnic groups, the mostly settled Dinka Ngok, and the mostly nomadic Misseriya, remain strained. The fact that Abyei’s borders have been changed several times during the CPA implementation process has not made the situation any easier (see figure 7).

**Figure 7: Border Re-Demarcation Issues in Abyei**



Matters may well be brought to a head if and when the Abyei Administrative Area holds its referendum on whether it will join the new state of South Sudan or remain part of the north. Who is eligible to vote in the postponed referendum remains a point of serious controversy. Abyei has thus always been seen as the most dangerous flashpoint for large-scale violence between north and south. Tensions flared in April 2011 with the publication of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan and its bald statement that the Abyei Area is part of the Republic's territory.<sup>151</sup> That problem was somewhat alleviated by a deal in which both sides promised to remove unconditional claims to Abyei from their draft national constitutions.

However, this turned out to be a prelude to more violence not peace. In late May, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers forcibly occupied Abyei town, destroying much of its infrastructure and looting various supplies in the process. They also blocked the return of many thousands of the people displaced by their acts of aggression, including through the use of land mines and the destruction of important infrastructure.<sup>152</sup> According to a leaked UNMIS report, although both sides (the SAF and the SPLA) had engaged in acts against civilians, "it is the conduct of the SAF [that] has been especially egregious." This included the use of aerial bombardment, "intensified ground assaults on civilian populated areas", and "conducting house to house searches and systematically burning houses of suspected SPLM/A supporters." Furthermore, the SAF engaged in "violent and unlawful acts against UNMIS." The UN considered the "attacks on UNMIS ... so egregious that condemnation is insufficient. ... The international community must hold the Government of Sudan accountable for its conduct and insist that it arrests and bring to justice those responsible."<sup>153</sup> As noted in **Section 1**, the parties eventually concluded a deal to demilitarize the area and have it supervised by the UNISFA peacekeeping mission. However, not only did the SAF refuse to withdraw but in a worrying escalat-

tion of the violence beyond Abyei in early June, the Sudanese army bombed SPLA troops and civilians in Pariang County, Unity State, and in September it launched an offensive in Blue Nile State (see below).

Other contentious issues include how to deal with Sudan's outstanding international debt (amounting to some \$40 billion) and developments in the military sector, where southerners remain part of the Sudanese Armed Forces and many northerners part of the SPLA.<sup>154</sup> The likelihood of instability in the military sector is particularly high. Indeed, dissolution of the Joint Integrated Units that were set up to form the core of the SAF in the event of unity has already generated violence.

### Intra-South Sudan

Although the euphoria surrounding the prolonged birth of South Sudan has been incredible to watch, independence alone will not solve the sources of armed conflict within the new state. Indeed, the focus on achieving independence has obscured many of the fundamental internal problems facing the new Republic of South Sudan. Among the most important are its corrupt ruling regime, the new state's lack of capacity and infrastructure, its high degree of militarization, and its worrying levels of underdevelopment. Moreover, if the new government in Juba does not go at least a reasonable way towards meeting the high local expectations of a peace dividend and more effective governance, the backlash may be substantial. These expectations will be difficult to meet for three main reasons. First, the new government of South Sudan lacks effective administrative capacity across a wide range of sectors – in short, it lacks the basic requirement of a rational-legal state, a functioning civil service. Throughout much of the country, it is churches and NGOs which deliver services to people not the government. Second, it continues to suffer from serious levels of corruption, which is a major impediment to the new state's development pros-


pects.<sup>155</sup> Third, the sheer scale of the challenge confronting the new government is enormous. The new South Sudan will start life with more than 50% of its people living below the poverty line, over 90% of its women illiterate, and only about 50% of the population having access to improved drinking water.<sup>156</sup> In addition, the infrastructural conditions are dire: despite being roughly the same size as France, southern Sudan has only 5,500km of main roads and 7,500km of feeder roads – almost all of these are unpaved and almost all the paved roads are in Juba.

Worryingly, levels of armed violence have been higher within southern Sudan than they have been in any other part of the country, including Darfur. Estimates for 2009, for instance, suggest that more

than 2,500 people were killed in the region and some 360,000 displaced.<sup>157</sup> Figure 8 depicts the distribution of this violence and displacement across southern Sudan.

By the end of 2009, southern Sudan had also witnessed the return of more than 2.3 million people from the north, many of whom were unable to reclaim land or assets that they had previously occupied. The good news is that 2010 was significantly less bloody. However, violence has recently been used by numerous groups including the forces of General George Athor, Major-General Gabriel Tang, former South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) commander and then SPLA General Peter Gadet, SPLA Major-General Tahib Gatluak, as well as several hundred fighters loyal to David Yauyau. In

**Figure 8: Violence and Displacement in Southern Sudan, 2009**



addition to local political issues, a significant part of the problem here stems from the Juba Declaration's (January 2006) requirement that many soldiers from the SSDF be integrated into the SPLA.

The fundamental political problem for both north and south Sudan is that the CPA settlement, which has dictated the course of the transition, "was exclusively between two parties, both of which represented their respective elites" and neither of which catered for all their own supporters let alone other groups (there are currently more than 20 political parties operating in southern Sudan).<sup>158</sup> Another study put the point slightly differently when it concluded that the central problem was that the region's powerbrokers were themselves "actively stoking conflict in the South."<sup>159</sup>

The principal causes of violence in southern Sudan remains the source of debate. Ongoing research conducted by the World Bank has generated seven useful operational hypotheses on armed conflict in southern Sudan. These are summarized

#### Box 1: World Bank Working Hypotheses on Armed Conflict in Southern Sudan<sup>163</sup>

- **Hypothesis 1:** The lack of local development drives violent conflict [NO]
- **Hypothesis 2:** Scarcity of natural resources drives violent conflict [NO]
- **Hypothesis 3:** Unemployment drives violent conflict [YES]
- **Hypothesis 4:** Population displacement and return cause conflict [YES]
- **Hypothesis 5:** Perceptions on insecurity and inequity drive conflict [YES]
- **Hypothesis 6:** Contestation over decentralized resources drives conflict [YES]
- **Hypothesis 7:** Poor local governance drives conflict [YES]

in Box 1. The Bank's researchers are apparently set to conclude that the weakness of local administration and its articulation with communities is perhaps the most long-term and systemic risk to the peaceful development of southern Sudan.<sup>160</sup> Another recent study concluded that the outbreak of violence was most commonly associated with ethnic divisions (particularly where certain groups lack genuine representation in political structures), land and cattle disputes, and youth disaffection.<sup>161</sup> Notably, all these conflicts have been localized. As a result, the quality of local governance structures will be fundamental to the future political trajectory of southern Sudan. In addition, more effort must be devoted to enabling local traditional authorities (chiefs) to develop viable dispute settlement mechanisms through their customary courts.<sup>162</sup>

One prevalent but faulty assumption is that lack of development drives armed conflict. If that were true, South Sudan could expect little other than severe violence for the foreseeable future. In fact, there is no simple equation whereby underdevelopment produces violence and an increase in development automatically stimulates conflict resolution. As one very thorough analysis concluded, between 2005 and 2009 southern Sudan received approximately \$8 billion of international donor assistance and over \$8.3 billion in oil revenues, yet violent conflict persisted.<sup>164</sup> "Lack of development," the report argued, "might, at most, be a cause of disaffection that contributes to tension ... but it cannot be cited as either a sole or significant cause of conflict. [T]he link between delivering services and abating violence is not found in Southern Sudan."<sup>165</sup>

Looking to the future, the UN's Force Commander outlined three sensible priority areas for southern Sudan in the post-CPA period:

1. **Consolidate stable governance.** This must include democratic governance reform and institutional checks and balances to help the smooth cooperation between

the SPLM and other political parties (the trend of distributing government positions across the regional and ethnic/tribal spectrum should continue).

2. **Improve the safety and security of south Sudanese populations.** This must include professionalizing the new state's security, justice and conflict management institutions, but first and foremost the SPLA, which has clearly yet to complete the transition from insurgent guerillas to a government army.
3. **Improve the economy.** In the short-term, this will hinge on the conclusion of a workable deal on oil, but the new government in Juba needs to provide jobs and enhance its own technical capacities so that it can provide basic services to its people.<sup>167</sup> At present, there is a real danger of too much focus on Juba generating feelings of marginalization elsewhere in South Sudan. In the worst case scenario, this would replicate the dominant core-marginalized periphery dynamics which have generated so much violent conflict in the old Sudan.

To this list should be added a process of disarmament for local actors across southern Sudan and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for the SPLA. However, any program of DDR aimed at helping to transform the SPLA must differ substantially from the existing approach. To date, there have been four fundamental problems with the DDR program in southern Sudan which has left it making little discernible impact on either the conflict dynamics or the SPLA's transformation.<sup>168</sup> First, the initial calculations about the number of potential DDR candidates (90,000) were made without an accurate assessment of the SPLA's capabilities and without a strategic defense review setting out the overall purposes for which the SPLA should be used. Second,

because many SPLA personnel remained unconvinced that the war was over, they have viewed the CPA and interim period as little more than a strategic pause in the conflict. Consequently, they maintain a war mentality that requires them to remain on active alert to repel northern aggression. Third, in such a context, the DDR packages looked paltry compared to an SPLA salary, food supplies and pension. The net result was a DDR program which processed only a few thousand "special needs groups" – many of whom were not even in the SPLA when they entered the DDR program – and which affected neither conflict dynamics nor the SPLA's transformation. DDR in south Sudan will only become significant if it is tied explicitly to the SPLA's own vision of its transformation. Forcible disarmament initiatives should be avoided at all costs because they have a high risk of generating violence, as occurred in 2006 when the SPLA attempted to disarm Lou Nuer communities. Fourth, when faced with an oppositional militia within its territory, the Government of South Sudan has tended to either fight them or buy their support. The latter tactic has caused a considerable swelling of the SPLA which runs completely counter to the stated aims of the DDR program.

A final problem for southern Sudan, not of its own making, is the wandering Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Today's LRA can reasonably be characterized as a group of "killers without borders;" a regional cancer which needs to be excised – the sooner, the better.<sup>169</sup> According to UN estimates, the LRA has killed approximately 3,000 people and displaced about 400,000 between December 2008 and mid-2011.<sup>170</sup> Although the group's origins lie in the iniquitous political dynamics in northern Uganda, today's LRA has little connection to this situation, having been forced out of Uganda in 2006 and now operating as small fragmented units across a number of countries. Today's LRA consists of a key group of 3-5 senior leaders, most of whom are now getting old and have been indicted by the ICC;<sup>171</sup> a hard core of some 200-400 loyal fighters

who are now a mix of nationalities; and an unknown number of abductees who make up its rank and file. In recent years these marauders have done much of their damage in the Central African Republic, northern DR Congo and western Equatoria in Sudan. Sometimes the Ugandan armed forces have traipsed after them across these different countries, but with little discernible impact and with many fewer soldiers tasked with stopping the LRA today than in previous years. After decades of attempted negotiations it is clear that the LRA leadership in general, and Joseph Kony in particular, are not making rational political demands related to the situation in northern Uganda. Rather, their goal seems to be little more than the survival of the key leaders.

Given the dismal track record of the Ugandan armed forces in trying to defeat the LRA, there is little doubt that if a successful military initiative is to be conducted against this group it must be comprised of a sophisticated foreign or hybrid force and have the support of the UN Security Council. The African Union's current approach is to develop a Regional Task Force to eliminate the LRA comprised of troops from Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda. The exact concept of operations and strategies for protecting civilians from the LRA's attacks are still work-in-progress. In mid-October 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama deployed approximately 100 American combat troops to help provide "information, advice, and assistance" to these four African states.<sup>172</sup>

In the short-term, the key to success will lie in encouraging more defections from medium-level LRA fighters (who can provide good intelligence about the group's methods) and in developing greater coordination between the militaries in CAR, the DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda, as well as the relevant UN peacekeeping missions operating in these areas. Given that many of their victims are killed or captured because they do not get sufficient advance warning of the LRA's impending arrival in their village, much could be done to lower

the toll of people killed or abducted if effective communications networks (telephone or otherwise) could be established throughout the affected region. In that regard, initiatives such as the United States strategy to disarm the LRA as well as non-state efforts by groups such as Resolve and Invisible Children are a welcome development.

### **Intra-North Sudan**

As Alex de Waal has concluded, the two most important factors for understanding armed conflict across northern Sudan are center-periphery inequality and intra-elite competition.<sup>174</sup> The latter is often neglected because it is difficult for outsiders to understand. Other relevant factors identified by de Waal were the clash of identities, conflict over resources, and "brute causes," such as criminality, individual agency and the path dependence of violent cycles. De Waal subsequently developed his analysis around the concept of a "political marketplace" in which governments and rebel groups tend to operate through kinship and patronage networks and often by licensing proxies to pursue their goals. In this marketplace, he observed a series of auctions wherein political loyalty was traded among the different factions. Understood in this manner, armed revolts represent a form of "political bargaining using violence" as insurgents attempt to gain a higher price for their loyalty.<sup>175</sup>

Within this context, it is the Darfur region and the Three Areas (Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile) where armed conflict is most prevalent in northern Sudan. As noted in **Section 1**, eastern Sudan remains relatively calm in comparison.

### **Darfur**

In recent months, Darfur has seen an increase in violence. First, with the return of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim from Tripoli – with fresh supplies of weaponry pilfered from Libya – there has been a violent purging of the movement's ranks to consolidate his control. Second, the authorities in Khartoum

have begun recruiting more militias from northern Darfur to fight against the rebels.

Debate continues over what caused the war in Darfur, and hence what might be needed to resolve it.<sup>176</sup> For some, the key ingredient was the oppressive nature of the longstanding relationship between the dominant core of Khartoum and Sudan's marginalized peripheral zones. Darfur's rebellion was thus an attempt to gain a greater say in the region's governance and a better deal from the country's repressive centre. A related argument described the war as an almost inevitable consequence of the "turbulent" nature of the Sudanese state and the contests between rival factions within Khartoum where "provincial war and destabilization" had become their "habitual modus operandi."<sup>177</sup> A third view saw the key ingredient as ethnic tensions between Darfur's "Arab" and "African" populations. The Arab *janjawiid* were aroused, armed and supported by the government of Sudan and promised various rewards, mainly land and plunder, in exchange for their efforts to put down the rebellious "black Africans." A fourth perspective pointed to religious ingredients, specifically the intra-Islamic dimensions of the conflict and the struggle over what should count as the authentic version of Islam and what its relationship should be to the apparatus of the Sudanese state. A fifth set of views emphasized that war in Darfur could not have taken place without the long-standing system of regional conflicts that had developed since the 1960s between Sudan, Chad, Libya and to a lesser extent the Central African Republic. From this perspective, the current conflict was simply the latest episode in which Darfur became involved in a violent cycle of cross-border dynamics. Finally, some saw the war as being about resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions. This resource-based argument had many variants. One version saw the key ingredient as being "land envy" rather than "ethnic hatred." For others, the war could be boiled down to a "fight about grass" between Arab nomadic herders and African pastoralists. Still others thought the under-

lying ecological crisis and climate change were key factors.

The war in Darfur was framed simultaneously as a war about governance, the state and issues of self-determination; as an ethnic conflict; as religious fratricide and as a resource war. Whichever view one adopts should have a significant bearing on deciding upon the most appropriate instruments of conflict resolution.

During 2008 and 2009, rebel-versus-government violence decreased, criminalized violence became more prevalent, and inter- and intra-tribal violence increased. 2010, however, was rather more bloody with 2,321 fatalities occurring in Darfur, with tribal clashes accounting for 38% of this total.<sup>178</sup> The good news was that according to UNAMID estimates, between January and September 2011 the number of fatalities from violence had reduced to just over 700.<sup>179</sup> During the first half of the year, however, and while peace talks were taking place in Doha, Sudanese government attacks in Darfur drove at least 70,000 people into IDP camps. Government forces also continued their attacks on Jebel Marra, the initial rebel stronghold.<sup>180</sup> This left the UNAMID operation in an unenviable position.

In an intriguing development in April 2011, Sudan's National Elections Commission announced that it was working to hold a referendum in Darfur on July 1-2, which would determine whether Darfur should be treated as a single administrative region. Rebel movements engaged in the Doha peace process reportedly rejected Khartoum's unilateral decision to hold and organize such a referendum before a peace deal had been signed. In this context it is worth recalling that the failed Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 included provision for a referendum to determine the "permanent status of Darfur" within Sudan. This was scheduled to contain the following options for the administration of Darfur: (a) the creation of a Darfur Region composed of the three states; (b) retention of the status quo of three states.<sup>181</sup> In early May 2011, the Government of Sudan also approved a draft law



which created five administrative states in Darfur. The rebels have traditionally seen such a move as further evidence of Khartoum’s divide and rule strategy of carving Darfur up into smaller ethnic units. Given its recent efforts to recruit new militias in northern Darfur to fight against the rebels, these five states may be meant to correspond to the key militias in Khartoum’s divide and rule strategy.


***Southern Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile State***

In Southern Kordofan, like Blue Nile, the principal geostrategic context and source of much local trepidation is what political life as part of northern Sudan will entail now that South Sudan has achieved its independence and broken away; specifically, how will the governing regime in Khartoum treat these regions and what leverage will external actors retain over it after the south’s secession? Constitutionally, the CPA kept Blue Nile and Kordofan as northern states, but entitled them to hold a “popular consultation” exercise. While the future of these areas

remains uncertain, violence at the local level has continued largely unabated.

Since developments in the Abyei Area have already been discussed, this section focuses on events elsewhere in Southern Kordofan, in the Nuba Mountains, and in Blue Nile State. Many of the people of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile fought with the southerners during the civil war. As a result, they now face the very real prospect of living in northern Sudan without any effective mechanisms to determine their political future and influence the authorities in Khartoum. They are stuck in what Julie Flint called “a political limbo.”<sup>182</sup> Officially, all they have is the ill-defined and weak “popular consultation” process. As set out in the CPA’s Protocol on Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, this process was defined in vague terms as a “mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive agreement reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation

**Figure 9: Sources of Conflict in Southern Kordofan<sup>184</sup>**



Movement.” NCP supporters have exploited this imprecision to depict the popular consultation as a way for the SPLM to separate the region from the North and join it to the South.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, failure to implement this CPA Protocol effectively has added to the longstanding anger felt by the Nuba people towards the authorities in Khartoum. It has also left a variety of unresolved issues which have the potential to spark considerable renewed violence. First, there is the vexed question of the future of the SPLM in northern Sudan: will it be reinvented as a northern sector of the SPLM to pursue something akin to the “New Sudan” agenda, or will the NCP demand that it be dismantled altogether? Second, what will happen to the Nuba fighters who the NCP currently insists can only return to Southern Kordofan as civilians?

In this context of political uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that violence has persisted and is on the increase. Information gathered during early 2011 through community risk mapping workshops has provided useful insights into the causes of such armed conflicts in Southern Kordofan. These concluded that “issues around land are the predominant driver of conflict in the state.”<sup>185</sup> This takes several forms, principally conflict over land ownership, land use and over boundaries. Such conflicts have been particularly intense in the Abyei–Muglad locality which has witnessed fighting over borders between Unity and Abyei Area, partly generated by the lack of widespread acceptance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision, as well as seasonal disputes over land ownership and land use, especially related to access to water and pasture. The latter form of conflict has also been prevalent in Buram locality where nomads and settled communities have fought over water near Lake al Abyad. Other sources of violence in the state have been identified as conflicts over compensation from oil

companies, tribal conflicts, and disputes between members of different political parties. Participants at these workshops concluded that conflict resolution required the disarmament of civilians; the formation of a State Land Commission to clarify land use and outstanding disputes on land tenure; enhancement of the rule of law; greater investment in infrastructure and basic services especially related to water provision; and the clear identification of migration routes along with timelines for movement across agricultural areas. The various sources of conflict in Southern Kordofan identified in the risk mapping workshops are depicted in figure 9.

More recently, the SAF has launched renewed offensives in Blue Nile State involving heavy weaponry and aerial bombardments against civilians. It has also clashed once again with the SPLM–North in Southern Kordofan. The resumption of war in Blue Nile is particularly worrying because it is likely that, as Julie Flint warned, if this region “explodes ... the SPLM North will be banned in Sudan and all chance of negotiation will be lost for the foreseeable future.”<sup>186</sup>

Khartoum’s recent offensives across Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile State and Darfur have prompted a range of rebel groups – SLA/Minni Minawi, SLA/Abdul Wahid, JEM, and SPLM–North – to band together around a shared interest in regime change. Politically, the results are uncertain but on the battlefields of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile it seems likely that a military stalemate will endure as the SAF will find it almost impossible to dislodge its opponents from key strongholds. In the meantime, the proxy destabilization tactics and domestic political jockeying will continue on both sides of the North–South border.

## SECTION 5: PRIORITIES FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

The preceding analysis suggests that a comprehensive policy towards the Horn of Africa would need to operate across a wide range of sectors and address issues at a variety of levels, from local disputes all the way up to globalizing processes and networks. As one of the world's most conflict-ridden and insecure regions, there are no quick fixes to peace and security challenges in the Horn. Constant gardening is thus the appropriate metaphor to guide policy.

This is not the place to set out in detail what a revised U.S. strategy towards the Horn of Africa might entail. For some initial ideas, readers are referred to the Wilson Center's partner document, *Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: What role for the United States?* Nevertheless, it is worth sketching in very broad brushstrokes what strategic priorities might guide those actors interested in promoting a more peaceful, prosperous and well-governed Horn of Africa. The five focal areas suggested here are:

- prioritize conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives,
- promote good governance,
- strengthen regional cooperation,
- alleviate food insecurity, and
- boost economic growth and regional economic integration.

### **Prioritize Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Initiatives**

In 2007, John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen called for the U.S. government to launch a "Greater Horn peace initiative" in collaboration with the AU and the UN Secretary-General. Its central objectives should be to promote conflict resolution and good governance in the region, in part because these are the key to countering terrorism and extremism. They suggested the initiative should revolve around renewed efforts to mediate

an end to the region's armed conflicts, boosting the peacekeeping capacity available to the region; and threatening, and when necessary using, "multilateral penalties of some type."<sup>187</sup> This call is as pertinent in mid-2011 as it was four years earlier.

Conflicts can only be genuinely resolved through engagement and painstaking negotiation. As a consequence, at the heart of any regional peace initiative must be a willingness to encourage sustained and frank dialogue with the key players. Of course, the short-term prospects for resolving peacefully the differences between, for example, Meles and Isaias, Khartoum and Juba, or the TFG and *al-Shabaab* are not good. But three issues are crucial here. First, these dyads are not the only key players in these conflict zones. The dialogue must be extended to include other voices, particularly those of unarmed constituencies. Second, left to fester without sustained attempts to facilitate constructive dialogue these conflicts are likely to get worse, not better. Third, the UN and other international actors are not well served by leaving critical peace deals unimplemented, such as the Algiers Agreement (2000).

In a major new study on how states have successfully turned their enemies into "reliable partners in peace," Charles Kupchan concluded that although cases of inter-state rapprochement are unique, they all follow the same basic sequence: unilateral accommodation sets the stage for reciprocal restraint, which then provides a foundation for societal integration and, ultimately, the generation of new narratives that transform oppositional identities into a shared identity.<sup>188</sup> Rapprochement thus "emerges as a product of engagement, not coercion: peace breaks out when adversaries settle their differences, not when one side forces the other into submission." Moreover, he suggests that commercial integration is much less important than commonly presumed. It is diplomacy, not economic interdependence that represents "the currency of peace." Interestingly for the Horn of Africa,

Kupchan's study concludes that "especially during the initial phases of rapprochement between antagonistic states, regime type is not a determinant of outcomes; democracies and autocracies alike can make for reliable partners in peace."

If Kupchan is correct, the foundation for a sound Horn of Africa strategy must be built on strong mediation capabilities and a willingness to engage in dialogue with all conflict parties. Yet where are the mediation teams and support structures that could carry out this painstaking work? Actors interested in resolving some of the Horn's conflicts should help fill this glaring gap. Starting such initiatives would not be expensive, particularly compared to military initiatives, but it would take time to develop the relevant expertise to function effectively at multiple levels of conflict across the region.<sup>189</sup>

### Promote Good Governance

As discussed in **Section 3**, governance indicators across the Horn are generally dire. A central policy challenge is therefore how to reform governance structures across the region. Because the region is governed nationally and locally, these are the levels which should be given immediate priority.

There are no easy or quick fixes but in an abstract sense, governance reform must involve building institutions independent of presidential power, such as parliaments, judiciaries, and media; facilitating dialogues between the region's governments and outsiders, between the governments themselves, and between the governments and their own citizens; building consensus around the idea that a loyal opposition has crucial roles to play in a well-governed state; curbing corruption; promoting the rule of law; and encouraging greater participation of women. Practical options might include support for electoral commissions, voter education programs, women's associations, rule of law programs, citizen education especially with regard to basic literacy skills, as well as security sec-

ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE HORN'S STATES HAVE ACHIEVED IMPRESSIVE RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RECENT YEARS, A MAJORITY OF THE REGION'S PEOPLE STILL LIVE IN POVERTY.

tor reform initiatives. Corruption might be tackled in part through the type of public finance management reforms that have been adopted in Kenya and Uganda. But it will also be necessary to strengthen tax systems so that governments can reliably generate revenues.

For outsiders to be taken seriously on these issues, they must approach the locals with a significant degree of humility; they must adopt consistent policies which treat friends and foes alike; they should declare an interest in *how* good governance works rather than a preference for *who* governs; and they must find local partners because governance reform cannot be imposed from the outside. With the specific features of the Horn in mind, three sensible priorities would be to try and ensure that the armed forces stay out of politics, that presidential term limits are established, and that constitutional systems are not predicated on any one set of religious beliefs.

### Strengthen Regional Cooperation


The region's governments must overcome the legacy of mutual destabilization which has generated so much mistrust between them. Again, this will not be easy, but other parts of the world – includ-

ing Europe, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa – have shown how historical legacies of enmity and mistrust might be overcome. The central priority should be to generate a regional consensus on how to handle security challenges, what political values should be promoted, and what instruments of conflict management are legitimate and likely to be most effective.

IGAD represents one appropriate forum in which this could be tried, although there are many obstacles to overcome and mechanisms should be developed which allow greater input from civil

society groups.<sup>190</sup> At the operational level, an important starting point would be to encourage greater cooperation across the region’s armed forces. This is one of the reasons why it is important to support collective efforts to get east Africa’s regional standby brigade up and running, so that the region’s militaries can gain experience of working together rather than against one another. Support should also be given to IGAD’s non-military activities such as its early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN). Strengthening collaborative efforts across the region as well as supporting the train-

**Figure 10: Food Security Situation, September 2011**  
(Source: OCHA Sept. 7, 2011)



ing of more government and civil society actors in early warning and preventive diplomacy would be a welcome development. It is also worth encouraging and supporting offers of mediation like that made by the authorities in South Sudan to facilitate a resolution of the Eritrea–Ethiopia border issue.

### **Alleviate Food Insecurity**

Following two consecutive seasons of significantly below-average rainfall, the Horn is currently facing the most severe food security emergency in the world today with more than thirteen million people in need for humanitarian assistance. As depicted in figure 10, the worst affected areas are in southeastern Ethiopia, northern Kenya and especially south central Somalia. While worrying, the bigger issue is that similar famines have been a regular occurrence across the region for decades.

Ensuring food security across the region must therefore occupy a central place in any new approach. The U.S. government’s recent “Feed the Future” food security initiative is a welcomed move in the right direction, and with its potential focus countries to include Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, this is likely to benefit the Horn’s populations. But as currently defined, it must figure out how to prevent governments and insurgents using food as a weapon and it will not reach hungry people in Somalia, Eritrea or Sudan. One useful additional step would involve working hard to promote common management of water resources and livestock across the region, which would considerably boost the chances for delivering food security.

### **Boost Economic Growth and Regional Integration**

Although some of the Horn’s states have achieved impressive rates of economic growth in recent years, a majority of the region’s people still live in poverty. Consequently, the central economic goal of a new approach must be to encourage broad-based economic growth which is explicitly har-

nessed to poverty-alleviation policies. This will be more likely to occur in the context of regional integration, particularly if the levels of intra-regional trade can be significantly increased and progress is made on developing a regional common market. Growth and integration are not a panacea, however. Not only is intra-regional trade not crucial to the economies of most of the region’s states, but all economic activity generates winners and losers and the consequences need to be carefully managed. Moreover, as the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia demonstrates, even states whose economies are deeply integrated are not immune from serious violent conflict.

Nevertheless, regional integration could be significantly enhanced by promoting interconnectivity across the region in energy and transport through the building of roads and power plants. This is particularly important given that two states (South Sudan and Ethiopia) are landlocked, with all this implies for the importance of roads, pipelines, and sea ports. Mutually beneficial economic relationships should also be encouraged across the region, for example, by encouraging both sets of Sudanese authorities to continue supplying Ethiopia with oil while persuading Ethiopia to supply its neighbors with electricity derived from its hydropower activities on the Blue Nile. If properly harnessed, Ethiopia could generate enough power from the Blue Nile to keep the entire subcontinent running.

## CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Political business as usual has failed the peoples of the Horn of Africa: it has not brought them peace, prosperity, freedom, or genuine security. It is time for powerful external actors such as the U.S. government to develop a new approach to the region. This paper has suggested that a new set of peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives in several keystone conflicts should form the heart of such an approach but that these would be more likely to be effective if parallel efforts were made to promote good governance, regional cooperation, food security, and widespread economic growth, in part by stimulating regional economic integration. It also suggested that any new approach must be cognizant of the multiple levels on which the seeds of armed conflict are planted and the complex webs of interconnected issues related to governance, local politics, mutual destabilization, borderlands and frontier zones, resources, and diaspora groups.

This project provides an opportunity to kick-start debate about these issues within the U.S. government, civil society groups both inside and outside the Horn, as well as the countries that make up the region. In that spirit, this paper concludes with a set of questions intended to stimulate discussion about how the U.S. government might develop its policies towards the Horn:

- What are the principal sources of leverage that the U.S. government possesses over regimes, international organizations, and armed groups in the Horn of Africa?
- What are the principal barriers preventing the formulation and implementation of a new U.S. strategy towards the Horn of Africa?
- What should be the central strategic objectives and priorities of a new approach? To what extent should they build on the U.S. government's previous Greater Horn of Africa Initiative developed during the 1990s?
- What should constitute the principal benchmarks for judging the success/failure of any new approach to the Horn of Africa?
- What additional/new resources are required to make peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives a priority in the Horn of Africa?
- How might external actors help improve governance indicators across the region?
- What can external actors do to foster regional political cooperation across the Horn of Africa?
- How might food security be improved across the region?
- What are the most important first steps to increase economic growth and regional economic integration across the Horn of Africa?
- What constructive role(s) can diaspora groups play in the short- and long-terms to support these priorities?

## Appendices A-C

### Political Violence in the IGAD States 1990-2010<sup>191</sup>

#### Appendix A: State-Based Armed Conflicts, 1990-2010

State-based armed conflicts are those in which a government is one of the warring parties.

| Conflict                  | Years of Violence         | Active Dyads/Years                           | Fatalities (best estimate) |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|--|----------------------------|
| <b>Djibouti</b>           | 1991-4, 1999              | Govt vs FRUD 1991-4                          | 260                        |
|                           |                           | Govt vs FRUD-AD 1999                         | 25                         |
| <b>Djibouti-Eritrea</b>   | 2008                      | Govt vs Govt 2008                            | 35                         |
| <b>Eritrea</b>            | 1997, 1999, 2003          | Govt vs EIJM-AS 1997, 1999, 2003             | 113                        |
| <b>Eritrea-Ethiopia</b>   | 1998-2000                 | Govt vs Govt 1998-2000                       | 98,177                     |
| <b>Ethiopia</b>           | 1990-1                    | Govt vs EPRDF 1990-1                         | 23,498                     |
| <b>Ethiopia (Afar)</b>    | 1996                      | Govt vs ARDUF 1996                           | 25                         |
| <b>Ethiopia (Eritrea)</b> | 1990-1                    | Govt vs EPLF 1990-1                          | 37,540                     |
| <b>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</b>  | 1993, 1996, 1998-2009     | Govt vs Al-Itahad al-Islami 1993, 1996, 1999 | 247                        |
|                           |                           | Govt vs ONLF 1996, 1998-2009                 | 933                        |
| <b>Ethiopia (Oromiya)</b> | 1990-2, 1994-5, 1998-2009 | Govt vs OLF 1990-2, 1994-5, 1998-2009        | 1,998                      |
| <b>Somalia</b>            | 1990-6, 2001-2, 2006-10   | TFG vs al-Shabaab 2008-10                    | 4,732                      |
|                           |                           | TFG vs ARS-UIC 2006-8                        | 2,133                      |
|                           |                           | TFG vs Harakat Ras Kamboni 2008              | 37                         |
|                           |                           | TFG vs Hizbul Islam 2009                     | 150                        |
|                           |                           | Govt vs SNM 1990-1                           | 1,529                      |
|                           |                           | Govt vs SPM 1990-1                           | 840                        |
|                           |                           | Govt vs SRRC 2001-2                          | 321                        |
|                           |                           | Govt vs USC/SNA (USC faction) 1991-6         | 5,780                      |
|                           |                           | Govt vs USC/SSA 1991-6                       | 4,456                      |



|               |                   |                                     |        |
|---------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|--------|
| <b>Sudan</b>  | 1990-2010         | Govt vs JEM 2003-4, 2007-10         | 2,432  |
|               |                   | Govt vs NDA 1996-2001               | 2,831  |
|               |                   | Govt vs NRF 2006                    | 810    |
|               |                   | Govt vs SLM/A 2003-6, 2008-10       | 4,644  |
|               |                   | Govt vs SLM/A (MM) 2006             | 134    |
|               |                   | Govt vs SLM/A-Unity 2007-8          | 122    |
|               |                   | Govt vs SPLM/A 1990-2004            | 27,158 |
| <b>Uganda</b> | 1990-2, 1994-2010 | Govt vs ADF 1996-2002, 2007         | 1,879  |
|               |                   | Govt vs LRA 1990-1, 1994-8, 2000-10 | 7,785  |
|               |                   | Govt vs UNRF II 1997                | 35     |
|               |                   | Govt vs UPA 1990-2                  | 653    |
|               |                   | Govt vs WNBF 1996                   | 198    |

## Appendix B: Non-State Armed Conflicts, 1990-2010

*Non-state armed conflicts* are those where organized, collective armed violence occurs but where a recognized government is not one of the parties. Examples might include violent intercommunal conflicts or fighting between warlords and clans.

| Country                                 | Years of Violence    | Active Dyads/Years                         | Fatalities (Best Estimate) |
|---|----------------------|--|----------------------------|
| Djibouti                                | 1991                 | Afar, Oromo vs Issa 1991                   | 40                         |
| Ethiopia                                | 1991-2, 1998, 2000-9 | Afar tribe vs Issa tribe 2002              | 75                         |
|   |                      | Afar tribe vs Kereyou tribe 2002-3         | 69                         |
|   |                      | Al-Shabaab vs ONLF 2007                    | 40                         |
|   |                      | Amaro clan vs Guji clan 2006               | 30                         |
|   |                      | Amhara vs Oromo 1991, 2000-1               | 233                        |
|   |                      | Anuak vs Highlanders 2004                  | 114                        |
|   |                      | Anuak tribe vs Dinka tribe (Ethiopia) 2002 | 41                         |
|   |                      | Anuak tribe vs Nuer (Ethiopia) 2002-3      | 137                        |
|   |                      | Arbore vs Borana 1992                      | 317                        |
|   |                      | Bi'idyahan clan vs Ismail clan 2003        | 280                        |
|   |                      | Borana vs Degodia 1998                     | 156                        |
|   |                      | Borana vs Garre subclan 2001               | 60                         |
|   |                      | Borana clan vs Gabra clan 1992             | 201                        |
|   |                      | Borana vs Geri 2009                        | 31                         |
|   |                      | Borana, Guji vs Geri 2000                  | 72                         |
|   |                      | Borana clan vs Guji clan 2006              | 101                        |
|   |                      | Borana clan vs Konso 2008                  | 46                         |
|   |                      | Burji clan vs Guji clan 2006               | 37                         |
|   |                      | Dawa clan vs Gura clan 2003                | 55                         |
|   |                      | Derashe vs Konso 2008                      | 33                         |
|   |                      | Derashe vs Zeyle 2001                      | 40                         |
|   |                      | Dizi tribe vs Surma tribe 2002             | 35                         |
|   |                      | Gabra clan vs Guji clan 2005               | 43                         |
|   |                      | Gedo vs Guji 1998                          | 700                        |
|   |                      | Gumuz vs Oromo 2008                        | 145                        |
|   |                      | Issa vs Oromo 2000                         | 40                         |
|   |                      | Majerteen subclan vs Ogaden clan 2004      | 54                         |
|   |                      | Marehan subclan vs Majerteen subclan 2006  | 100                        |
|   |                      | Me'en vs Suri 2001                         | 34                         |
|   |                      | Merille vs Turkana 2005, 2009              | 72                         |
| Murle vs Nuer (Ethiopia) 2006           | 59                   |  |                            |
| Nyangatom, Toposa vs Turkana 2006       | 58                   |  |                            |
| Ogaden clan vs Sheikhal clan 2002       | 435                  |  |                            |
| Oromo tribes vs Somali clans 2003, 2005 | 135                  |  |                            |
| Reer Liban vs Reer Samatar 1992         | 100                  |  |                            |

|                |                               |  |     |
|----------------|-------------------------------|--|-----|
| <b>Kenya</b>   | 1992-2001,<br>2005-6,<br>2008 | Ajuran vs Garre subclan 2000   | 78  |
|                |                               | Borana vs Gabra 2005   | 68  |
|                |                               | Borana vs Samburu 2001   | 30  |
|                |                               | Dassanetch vs Turkana 1997, 2000, 2005   | 206 |
|                |                               | Dongiro vs Turkana 2006  | 48  |
|                |                               | Garre subclan vs Murule subclan 2005, 2008   | 92  |
|                |                               | Jie Karimojong vs Matheniko Karimojong, Turkana 1999   | 40  |
|                |                               | Jie Karimojong vs Turkana 2008   | 40  |
|                |                               | Kalenjin vs Kikuyu Kisii 1994  | 30  |
|                |                               | Kalenjin vs Kikuyu 1992-3, 1998, 2008  | 274 |
|                |                               | Kalenjin vs Luhya 1992   | 45  |
|                |                               | Kalenjin vs Luo, Kisii 1992  | 40  |
|                |                               | Kalenjin vs Kisii 2008   | 81  |
|                |                               | Kikuyu vs Maasai 1993  | 39  |
|                |                               | Kisii vs Maasai 1997   | 57  |
|                |                               | Luo vs Kikuyu 2008   | 42  |
|                |                               | Marakwet vs Pokot 2001   | 44  |
|                |                               | Mooreland vs SLDF 2008   | 32  |
|                |                               | Nandi vs Pokot 1998  | 35  |
|                |                               | Nyangatom vs Turkana 1993, 2006  | 234 |
| <b>Somalia</b> | 1990-2006,<br>2008-10         | Abgal clan vs Galgalo subclan of Habar Gidir (Hawiye) 1990   | 50  |
|                |                               | Aulihan subclan of Ogaden clan (Darod) vs Mohamed Zubeir subclan of Ogaden clan (Darod) 2000         | 41  |
|                |                               | Abdalle subclan of Habar Awal clan (Isaaq) vs Aidagalla subclan of Habar Garhadjis clan (Isaaq) 1996 | 34  |
|                |                               | Abdalleh-Agon-Yar subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) vs Eli-Agon-Yar subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) 2000 | 26  |
|                |                               | Abdulleh-Galmaha subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) vs Kabaloh subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) 2001       | 33  |
|                |                               | Ayr subclan of Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye) vs Sa'ad subclan of Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye) 2001          | 50  |
|                |                               | Abdalle-Aroneh subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) vs Eli-Omar subclan of Abgal clan (Hawiye) 1999        | 31  |
|                |                               | Habar Jaalo clan (Isaaq) vs Habar Yunis subclan of Habar Garhadjis clan (Isaaq) 1992                 | 500 |
|                |                               | Abdirizak Bihi vs Ahmed Sheikh Buraleh 2001  | 33  |

|                |                                      |   |       |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|---|-------|
| <b>Somalia</b> | 1990-2006,                           | Hussein Ali Ahmed vs Muse Sudi Yalahow 1999   | 113   |
|                | 2008-10                              | Abdurahman Ahmed Ali 'Tur' vs Mohamed Ibrahim Egal 1994-5   | 465   |
|                |                                      | Galje'el clan (Hawiye) vs Xawadle subclan (Hawiye) 2000   | 62    |
|                |                                      | Issa Muse subclan of the Habr Awal clan (Isaaq) vs Habar Yunis subclan of Habar Garhadjis clan (Isaaq) 1992 | 2,000 |
|                |                                      | Afi subclan vs Abtisame subclan 2004  | 26    |
|                |                                      | Agon-Yar subclan vs Warsangeli subclan 2002   | 87    |
|                |                                      | Ali-Gaf subclan vs Mahadade subclan 2002  | 33    |
|                |                                      | ARPCT vs ARS/UIC 2006   | 562   |
|                |                                      | Dabare subclan vs Luway subclan 2004  | 47    |
|                |                                      | Da'ud subclan vs Warsangeli subclan 2004  | 132   |
|                |                                      | Dir clan vs Marehan subclan 2004  | 121   |
|                |                                      | Dir clan vs Sa'ad subclan 2002-3  | 115   |
|                |                                      | Dizi vs Suri 1991, 1993, 2002   | 187   |
|                |                                      | Duduble subclan vs Suleiman subclan 2004  | 47    |
|                |                                      | Abdullahi Yusuf vs Jama Ali Jama 2002   | 52    |
|                |                                      | Galje'el clan vs Jejele subclan 2005  | 36    |
|                |                                      | Gaadsan subclan vs Ma'alın Weyne subclan 2008   | 40    |
|                |                                      | Garre subclan of Digil clan (Digil-Mirifle) vs Jiddo subclan of Digil clan (Digil-Mirifle) 2000, 2002       | 57    |
|                |                                      | Garre subclan vs Marehan 2005   | 99    |
|                |                                      | Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye) vs Xawaadle subclan (Hawiye) 1994   | 38    |
|                |                                      | Habar Gidir clan (Hawiye) vs Marehan subclan of Sede clan (Darod) 1993                                      | 30    |
|                |                                      | Huber subclan vs Yantar subclan 2005  | 35    |
|                |                                      | Jareer subclan vs Jiddo subclan 2002  | 28    |
|                |                                      | JVA vs JVA faction 2003   | 25    |
|                |                                      | JVA vs SSDF (Somalia) 2004  | 37    |
|                |                                      | Marehan subclan vs Fiqi Mohamed subclan 2003  | 104   |
|                |                                      | Marehan subclan vs Majerteen subclan 1997-9   | 516   |
|                |                                      | Mohamed Muse subclan vs Warsangeli subclan 2003   | 58    |
|                |                                      | Ogaden clan vs Sheikhal clan 1999   | 70    |
|                |                                      | Puntland vs Somaliland 2004   | 34    |
|                |                                      | RRA vs RRA-MH 2002-3, 2005  | 294   |
|                |                                      | RRA vs USC/SNA 1995-9   | 427   |
|                |                                      | SDM pro-Aideed vs SDM pro-Mahdi 1992  | 70    |
|                |                                      | SNA vs SNF 1993   | 39    |
|                |                                      | SNF vs USC/SNA 1992, 1995   | 91    |
|                |                                      | Sa'ad subclan vs Suleiman subclan 2004-6  | 307   |
|                |                                      | SNF (ADRA) vs SNF (HRHHY) 2004  | 69    |
|                |                                      | SNF-MSAB vs SNF 1999  | 51    |
|                |                                      | SPM vs SPM/SNA 1993-4   | 214   |
|                |                                      | SPM vs USC/SNA 1992   | 300   |
|                | USC/SNA vs Digil Salvation Army 1999 | 35  |       |
|                | USC/SNA vs SSNM 2003                 | 28  |       |
|                | USC/SSA-F vs USC/SSA 2001-3          | 168   |       |
|                | USC/SNA USC/SNA-OA 1995-7            | 431   |       |

|                |                       |   |     |
|----------------|-----------------------|---|-----|
| <b>Somalia</b> | 1990-2006,<br>2008-10 | USC/SNA vs USC-PM 1995                                | 46  |
|                |                       | SSDF vs Al-Ittihad al-Islami 1992                     | 625 |
|                |                       | SSDF vs USC/SNA 1993                                  | 200 |
|                |                       | Abgal clan (Hawiye) vs Xawaadle subclan (Hawiye) 2008 | 31  |
|                |                       | ASWJ vs al-Shabaab 2008-10                            | 834 |
|                |                       | Al-Shabaab vs Hizbul Islam 2009-10                    | 209 |
|                |                       | Qubeys subclan vs Suleyman subclan 2010               | 88  |

|                                |           |   |       |
|--------------------------------|-----------|---|-------|
| <b>Sudan</b>                   | 1990-2010 | Awlad Omran clan vs Awlad al-Zuid clan 1993       | 108   |
|                                |           | Awlad al-Zuid clan vs Zaghawa 2001                | 70    |
|                                |           | Aliab (Dinka) vs Mundari 2009                     | 52    |
|                                |           | Aqar (Dinka) vs Aqok (Dinka) 2006                 | 60    |
|                                |           | Atuat Dinka vs Ciec Dinka 2010                    | 27    |
|                                |           | Bari vs Mundari 2009                              | 41    |
|                                |           | Bor Dinka vs Mundari 2009                         | 42    |
|                                |           | Didinga vs Toposa 2007                            | 54    |
|                                |           | Dinka vs Nuer 2010                                | 228   |
|                                |           | Dinker vs Nuer 1997                               | 35    |
|                                |           | Ereigat Abbala Arabs vs Zaghawa 2002              | 37    |
|                                |           | Habaniya vs Falata 2007-9                         | 333   |
|                                |           | Habaniya vs Rizeigat Baggara 2006, 2009           | 394   |
|                                |           | Hotiya Baggara vs Newiba, Mahariba & Mahamid 2005 | 251   |
|                                |           | Janjaweed vs JEM 2003                             | 186   |
|                                |           | Janjaweed vs SLM/A 2005                           | 30    |
|                                |           | Janjaweed (Bin Kulaib) vs Janjaweed (Moro) 2005   | 44    |
|                                |           | Jikany Nuer vs Luo Nuer 1993                      | 1,001 |
|                                |           | Lou Nuer vs Hol Dinka 2008-9                      | 268   |
|                                |           | Lou Nuer vs Jikany Nuer 2009                      | 71    |
|                                |           | LRA vs SPLM/A 1995-6, 1998, 2004                  | 388   |
|                                |           | Luac Jang (Dinka) vs Awan (Dinka) 2009            | 30    |
|                                |           | Masalit vs Rizeigat Abbala 1998-9                 | 400   |
|                                |           | Missiriya vs Rizeigat Baggara 2008-10             | 653   |
|                                |           | Murle vs Bor Dinka 2007                           | 106   |
|                                |           | Murle vs Lou Nuer 2006, 2009                      | 912   |
|                                |           | Ngok Dinka vs Shilluk 2009                        | 121   |
|                                |           | Pari vs Toposa 1990                               | 35    |
|                                |           | Rek Dinka vs Gok Dinka 2010                       | 28    |
|                                |           | Rizeigat Abbala vs Zaghawa 1996                   | 166   |
|                                |           | Rizeigat Baggara vs Ma'aliyah 2002, 2004          | 123   |
|                                |           | SLM/A vs SLM/A (MM) 2005-6                        | 102   |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs SPLM/A-AH 1993                          | 55    |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs SPLM/A-WH 1992-3                        | 154   |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs SSDF 1991-4, 1997, 2002                 | 4,428 |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs South Sudan United Army 2000            | 390   |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs Uganda National Rescue Front II 1997    | 210   |
|                                |           | SPLM/A vs West Nile Bank Front 1995-7             | 213   |
|                                |           | SSDF vs Popular Defence Force 2002                | 38    |
|                                |           | SSDF vs South Sudan United Army 1998-9            | 515   |
| Terjam vs Rizeigat Abbala 2007 | 382       |   |       |
| Toposa vs Didinga 2007         | 54        |   |       |
| Toposa vs Turkana 1992         | 200       |   |       |
| Zaghawa vs Ma'aliyah 2008      | 41        |   |       |

|                      |                                   |   |     |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|---|-----|
| <b>Uganda</b>        | 1998–2001,<br>2003, 2005,<br>2007 | Arrow Boys vs LRA 2003                                  | 71  |
|                      |                                   | Bokora Karimojong vs Jie Karimojong 2000, 2003, 2007    | 346 |
|                      |                                   | Bokora Karimojong vs Matheniko Karimojong 1999          | 352 |
|                      |                                   | Bokora Karimojong vs Matheniko Karimojong, Turkana 2000 | 60  |
|                      |                                   | Bokora Karimojong vs Pian Karimojong 2003, 2005         | 64  |
|                      |                                   | Dodoch vs Jie Karimojong 2000, 2005                     | 198 |
|                      |                                   | Dodoch vs Turkana 2000                                  | 70  |
|                      |                                   | Dodoch vs Turkana, Toposa 2000                          | 43  |
|                      |                                   | Iteso vs Karimojong 2001                                | 32  |
|                      |                                   | Jie Karimojong vs Matheniko Karimojong 2005             | 26  |
|                      |                                   | Karimojong vs Pokot 1998, 2000                          | 194 |
|                      |                                   | Matheniko vs Pokot 1999                                 | 36  |
|                      |                                   | Pian Karimojong vs Pokot 2003                           | 93  |
| Pokot vs Sabinu 2003 | 30                                |   |     |

### Appendix C: Campaigns of One-Sided Violence, 1990-2010

*One-sided violence is “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded.*

| Country         | Years of Violence               | Active Dyads/Years                             | Fatalities (best estimate) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|--|----------------------------|
| <b>Ethiopia</b> | 1990-1, 1993,<br>2002-4, 2006-7 | Govt vs civilians 1990-1, 1993, 2002-4, 2006-7 | 1,180                      |
|                 |                                 | ONLF vs civilians 2007                         | 82                         |
| <b>Kenya</b>    | 2007-8                          | Govt vs civilians 2008                         | 64                         |
|                 |                                 | Mungiki vs civilians 2007-8                    | 69                         |
|                 |                                 | SLDF vs civilians 2007-8                       | 56                         |
| <b>Somalia</b>  | 1991-2, 1999,<br>2007-8, 2010   | al-Shabaab vs civilians 2008, 2010             | 131                        |
|                 |                                 | Govt vs civilians 2007-8                       | 67                         |
|                 |                                 | RRA vs civilians 1999                          | 37                         |
|                 |                                 | SPM/SNA OJ vs civilians 1992                   | 90                         |
|                 |                                 | USC vs civilians 1991                          | 50                         |
| <b>Sudan</b>    | 1990-2008                       | Govt vs civilians 1990-2008                    | 8,865                      |
|                 |                                 | Janjaweed vs civilians 2001-8                  | 3,321                      |
|                 |                                 | JEM vs civilians 2003                          | 69                         |
|                 |                                 | SLM/A (MM) vs civilians 2006                   | 72                         |
|                 |                                 | SLM/A vs civilians 2005                        | 63                         |
|                 |                                 | SPLM/A vs civilians 1992-3, 1995-8, 2002, 2004 | 1,057                      |
|                 |                                 | SSDF vs civilians 1991-3                       | 2,307                      |
|                 |                                 |  |                            |
| <b>Uganda</b>   | 1990-1, 1995-<br>2009           | Govt vs civilians 1990-1                       | 139                        |
|                 |                                 | ADF vs civilians 1997-2000                     | 693                        |
|                 |                                 | LRA vs civilians 1990-1, 1995-8, 2000-9        | 6,755                      |
|                 |                                 | UNRF II vs civilians 1997                      | 57                         |
|                 |                                 | UPA vs civilians 1990                          | 40                         |

Appendix D: Sudan, 2010<sup>192</sup>



## Appendix E: The Nile River Basin

[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRNILEBASINI/About%20Us/21082459/Nile\\_River\\_Basin.htm](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRNILEBASINI/About%20Us/21082459/Nile_River_Basin.htm)







## ENDNOTES

- 1 Although the Horn can be defined in numerous ways, in this paper it refers to the member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), namely, Djibouti, Eritrea (currently suspended), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. (The new Republic of South Sudan applied for IGAD membership in July 2011, which is expected to be granted in the near future.)
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